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AGAINST BALANCING:
REVISITING THE USE/REGULATION
DISTINCTION TO REFORM LIABILITY AND
COMPENSATION UNDER INVESTMENT
TREATIES
Jonathan Bonnitcha and Emma Aisbett*

I. INTRODUCTION
A network of over three thousand treaties governs international investment. These investment treaties share remarkable similarities in their struc1
ture and core provisions. They provide foreign investments with a suite of
legal protections from adverse conduct by “host” states in which they in2
vest. If a foreign investor believes that the host state has breached these

*
Jonathan Bonnitcha is a Senior Lecturer in law at the University of New South
Wales and Emma Aisbett is a Fellow at the School of Regulation and Global Governance
(RegNet) and Associate Director, Research for the Grand Challenge - Zero Carbon Energy
for the Asia Pacific at the Australian National University. Our thanks to Sarah Brewin, Tomer
Broude, David Gaukrodger, Caroline Henckels, Jarrod Hepburn, Anthea Roberts and Esme
Shirlow for helpful discussions and comments on a draft of this paper. Participants in the Society of International Economic Law Biennial Conference (Washington, D.C., July 2018), a
workshop hosted by the University of New South Wales Herbert Smith Freehills Law and
Economics Initiative (Sydney, Dec. 2018) and a workshop hosted by the Australian National
University’s School of Regulation and Global Governance (Canberra, Apr. 2019) provided
helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of the draft. Thanks to Alisha Mathew
for excellent research assistance. The University of New South Wales Herbert Smith Freehills
Law and Economics Initiative also provided generous financial assistance with the costs of
publication. Finally, we are grateful to the editors at the Michigan Journal of International
Law for their assistance in bringing this article to publication, notwithstanding the challenges
of a global pandemic.
1.
See generally RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2d ed. 2012); JONATHAN BONNITCHA, LAUGE N.
SKOVGAARD POULSEN & MICHAEL WAIBEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT
TREATY REGIME (2017). Consistently with the existing literature, our definition of ‘investment treaty’ includes bilateral investment treaties, plurilateral investment treaties, see, for example, Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M 360, and the investment chapters of
multi-issue free trade agreements. See, e.g., Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership, ch. 9, Mar. 8, 2018 [hereinafter CPTPP], https://www.dfat.gov.au
/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/Pages/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-transpacific-partnership.
2.
A growing minority of investment treaties also include provisions that require host
states to remove restrictions/limitations on incoming foreign investment—i.e. investment liberalization provisions. In this article, we do not address issues raised by these provisions. For
consideration of some of the issues raised by the interaction between investment protection
and investment liberalization provisions, see Emma Aisbett, Larry Karp & Carol McAusland,
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treaty protections, it can bring a claim against that state to international arbitration. This mechanism for adjudication of claims under investment treaties
is popularly known as investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”). If the investor is successful, the arbitral tribunal will require the host state to compensate the investor. These awards of compensation can be enforced internationally through associated regimes for the recognition and enforcement
3
of arbitral awards.
Once an obscure corner of international law familiar to only a handful
of specialists, investment treaties are now among the most controversial instruments of international economic governance. States, including the architects of the existing regime, are now reconsidering their participation in
4
such treaties. Two related features of investment treaties have proven particularly controversial. First, critics contend that investment treaties allow
5
foreign investors to challenge legitimate and justifiable regulatory changes.
Philip Morris’ challenge to the introduction of tobacco plain packaging in

Compensation for Regulatory Taking in International Investment Agreements: Implications of
National Treatment and Rights to Invest, 1 J. GLOB. & DEV. 1–3 (2010).
3.
See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, art. 1, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270; 575
U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966); Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, opened for signature Jun. 10, 1958, 3 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. 38 (1958).
4.
U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, for example, has criticized investorstate dispute settlement (“ISDS”) provisions in investment treaties. See In His Own Words:
Lighthizer Lets Loose on Business, Hill Opposition to ISDS, Sunset Clause, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (Oct. 19, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/trade/his-own-words-lighthizer-lets-loosebusiness-hill-opposition-isds-sunset-clause. The transition from the North American Free
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) to the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (“USMCA”)
has since removed the U.S.-Canada investment relationship from the coverage of ISDS. Compare North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289,
with United States of America, the United Mexican States and Canada Agreement, Off. U.S.
Trade Representative (July 1, 2020) [hereinafter USMCA], https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements
/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between. In May
2020, twenty-three European Union (“EU”) Member States signed a treaty to terminate intraEU bilateral investment treaties. EU Member States Sign an Agreement for the Termination of
Intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties, EUR. COMM’N (May 5, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu
/info/files/200505-bilateral-investment-treaties-agreement_en. However, the EU continues to
pursue investment treaties with other states. More generally, there is currently a multilateral
process underway within United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”) Working Group III for the reform of the investment treaty regime. See infra
Part VI. See generally Status of Preparatory Work on Reform Options and Schedule of
Events—Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, U.N. COMM’N ON
INT’L TRADE L. (May 14, 2020), https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state.
5.
See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of Investment
Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 353, 379 (2015); Lorenzo Cotula, Do Investment Treaties
Unduly Constrain Regulatory Space? 9 QUESTIONS INT’L. L. 19, 19–20 (2014); David
Gaukrodger, The Balance Between Investor Protection and the Right to Regulate in Investment Treaties: A Scoping Paper (Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. (“OECD”) Working Papers on
Int’l Inv. No. 2, 2017).
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Australia and Vattenfall’s challenge to the phase-out of nuclear power generation in Germany are high profile examples. Second, critics contend that
outsized awards of compensation place too great a burden on public financ6
es, particularly in developing countries. For example, in the recent case of
Tethyan Copper v. Pakistan, Pakistan was required to pay $5.9 billion U.S.
Dollars to a Canadian mining company for failing to issue a mining lease
7
required for the development of a planned copper mine to go ahead. Although the mine was never built, compensation in that case was based on the
mine’s projected income over its entire fifty-year operating cycle if it had
been allowed to go ahead. This award of compensation was almost as large
as the bailout that Pakistan and the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”)
had negotiated two months earlier to save the Pakistani economy from col8
lapse.
Many states have responded to the first of these concerns through revi9
sions to their treaty practice. To date, however, revisions to investment
treaties’ substantive provisions have been largely reactive and incremental,
in the sense that they seek to exclude particularly controversial provisions,
10
or interpretations of provisions, found in earlier generations of treaties.
These changes have not been linked to any underlying account of the economic rationale for granting internationalized legal protections to foreign
investment, or to any assessment of investment treaties’ effectiveness in

6.
A 2018 UNCTAD study found that the average amount of compensation awarded
was $504 million U.S. Dollars (“USD”), although the median award was significantly lower
at $20 million U.S. Dollars (“USD”), reflecting the impact of several very large awards on the
average. See generally U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 95
(2018). For a more recent compilation of all award over $100 million USD, see JONATHAN
BONNITCHA & SARAH BREWIN, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., COMPENSATION
UNDER INVESTMENT TREATIES 1, 29–31 (2019).
7.
Jeffrey Sachs, How World Bank Arbitrators Mugged Pakistan, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/world-bankcorrupt-arbitration-ruling-against-pakistan-by-jeffrey-d-sachs-2019-11.
8.
The bailout, negotiated in May 2019, was reported as providing a $6 billion USD in
funds to Pakistan. See Salman Masood, Pakistan to Accept $6 Billion Bailout from I.M.F.,
N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/12/world/asia/pakistan-imfbailout.html.
9.
See generally REASSERTION OF CONTROL OVER THE INVESTMENT TREATY
REGIME (Andreas Kulick ed., 2016).
10.
For example, the carve-out of tobacco control measures from the scope of ISDS
under the CPTPP. See CPTPP, supra note 1. Another example is the European Union’s clarification of the fair and equitable treatment standard in article 8.10(2) of the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union and its Member
States. See generally EU-Canada: Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement, EUR.
COMM’N [hereinafter CETA], http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ as discussed in
Caroline Henckels, Protecting Regulatory Autonomy Through Greater Precision in Investment Treaties: The TPP, CETA, and TTIP, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 27, 35–40 (2016). For a more
systematic analysis of these dynamics, see Wolfgang Alschner, The Impact of Investment Arbitration on Investment Treaty Design: Myth Versus Reality, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 35–36
(2016).
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achieving their policy objectives. Surprisingly little attention has been given
to the second of these concerns—that is, the principles governing compen11
sation under investment treaties.
In this context, we pose the following two questions in a companion
12
paper:
i.
In what circumstances should an investment treaty require
a host state to pay compensation for interference with foreign investment?
ii.
In such circumstances, how much compensation should be
required?
Although legal scholars tend to deal with these questions separately, we
show that they are intimately connected and should be dealt with together.
Using the tools of law and economics, we show that investment treaties are
likely to generate mutual benefits for host states and foreign investors to the
extent that they discipline opportunistic conduct by host states. We argue
that investment treaties should not constrain state’s ability to respond to new
information or to change their policy priorities. Our specific proposal is that
a state should only have to compensate the investor if it breaches or modifies the domestic legal regime governing the investment, and that compensation should be the lesser of the investor’s loss and the host state’s gain
from the host’s state not having had the new legal regime in place when the
13
investment was made.
Key practical implications of our proposal are that states should not be
required to compensate investors in many of the circumstances that are
compensable under existing investment treaty jurisprudence and that, insofar as compensation is required, the amount of compensation will ordinarily
be less than is currently the case. Another distinguishing feature of our proposal is that it does not require arbitral tribunals to weigh or balance competing interests in order to determine whether compensation is required or,
insofar as compensation is required, to determine the amount that should be
paid. This is a sharp break with existing investment treaty jurisprudence,
14
which relies heavily on balancing as a mode of arbitral reasoning, and also

11.
Cf. Diane A. Desierto, The Outer Limits of Adequate Reparations for Breaches of
Non-Expropriation Investment Treaty Provisions: Choice and Proportionality in Chorzów, 55
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 395 (2017); Steven Ratner, Compensation for Expropriations in a
World of Investment Treaties: Beyond the Lawful/Unlawful Distinction, 111 AM. J. INT. L. 7,
20–21 (2017).
12.
Emma Aisbett & Jonathan Bonnitcha, A Pareto-Improving Compensation Rule for
Investment Treaties 24 J. INT’L ECON. L. 181 (2021).
13.
This proposal draws on a set of concepts—notably, the concept of “the domestic
legal regime”—that are defined precisely in our companion paper. In Part II of this paper, we
recall the definitions of these concepts. In Part IV, we show how these concepts could be operationalized in investment arbitration as a practical matter.
14.
See infra Part IV.
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a point of contrast with other prominent proposals for reform. The title of
16
this article reflects this feature of our proposal.
In this article, we situate our proposal in relation to existing academic
debates, explore its implications in practice and consider additional policy
arguments for our proposal beyond the criterion of Pareto improvement de17
ployed in our companion paper. The article is organized as follows. Part II
provides an overview of the rationale for our proposal, as set out in our
companion paper. It also recalls the definitions of key concepts from our
companion paper and, in doing so, clarifies the series of questions a tribunal
would have to answer to apply our approach in practice.
Having briefly revisited the arguments of our companion paper in Part
II, Parts III-VI comprise the original contribution of this article. Part III situates our proposal within long-standing academic debates about the extent
to which private property should be protected from adverse government action. We show that legal scholarship on the protection of private property
from government interference can be divided into two broad traditions. The
first tradition maintains that, to determine whether government interference
with property requires compensation, a court or tribunal should balance the
investor’s interests against countervailing public interests that might justify
the interference. The second tradition posits that a court or tribunal should
distinguish government “use” (or appropriation) of property from government regulation of property, with only the former requiring compensation.
According to this tradition, the capacity in which the government is acting,
rather than weighing and balancing competing interests, determines a distinction between the use and regulation of private property. Our proposal
falls squarely within this second tradition. However, scholarship within this
tradition faces challenges of its own—notably, the difficulty in distinguishing between government “use” and “regulation” of property in complex cases.
Part IV explains how our proposal relates to the rules and principles
governing liability and compensation under existing investment treaties. We
use a series of well-known cases as examples to illustrate the implications.

15.
See, e.g., VALENTINA VADI, PROPORTIONALITY, REASONABLENESS AND
STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 263–65
(2018) (arguing for a more careful calibration of existing balancing techniques).
16.
To be clear, we are contrasting our proposal to alternatives in which arbitral tribunals are required to engage in balancing as a mode of reasoning in order to come to a decision
in the case before them. The concept of balance might also be understood in a different, wider
sense. Because legal regimes impact upon different interests, changes to the design of any legal regime might be said to have implications for the balance that regime strikes between interests. Our proposal does not obviate the need to consider how investment treaties affect diverse interests in this sense; indeed, our companion paper makes a sustained argument for
why our proposal should be preferred on this basis. We are grateful to David Gaukrodger for
encouraging us to clarify this point.
17.
Aisbett & Bonnitcha, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing Pareto improvement and defining it as occurring when at least one party is left better off and no party is left worse off).
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In the course of this exposition, we show that our proposal builds on concepts and approaches that have been implemented in other legal regimes.
For example, our approach to compensation is similar to the calculation of
compensation based on restitution and reliance in contract law. In pointing
to these similarities, we seek to pre-empt concerns that our proposal involves too radical a shift from current jurisprudence. By combining these
familiar concepts in a new way, we argue that our proposal resolves many
practical challenges with both the status quo and with previous attempts to
develop a workable jurisprudence based on the use/regulation distinction.
Part V develops the analysis of our companion paper by considering
additional political economy and democratic arguments for our proposal.
The model in our companion paper was based on the assumption that all organs of the host state fully and accurately internalize the welfare of all affected domestic constituencies in their decision-making. This is a common
simplifying assumption in the law and economics literature but it is not nec18
essarily empirically accurate. We show that our proposal is robust to variation in this assumption. Second, we consider the risk of more serious pathologies in government decision-making, such as susceptibility to lobbying
and capture by foreign investors. We argue that our proposal is also preferable to the status quo when these risks are taken into account. Third, and perhaps most importantly, we argue that there are strong democratic arguments
for preferring our proposal to the status quo.
Part VI connects our proposal to the multilateral discussions about reform of the investor-state dispute settlement system currently underway in
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”)
Working Group III. Reform of the principles governing compensation under
investment treaties is a key negotiating priority for developing countries. In
October 2019, the issue of the principles governing compensation was add19
ed to the agenda of Working Group.

II. OUR PROPOSAL: BASIC RATIONALE AND KEY CONCEPTS
In this section we set out the basic rationale for our proposal, as developed in our companion paper. We then explain the key conceptual building
blocks on which our proposal rests. In doing so, we clarify the series of
questions a tribunal would need to ask, and answer, in applying our approach.

18.
For example, Aisbett and Poulsen’s analysis of World Bank data survey data suggests that host states treat foreign firms no worse, on average, than comparable domestic
firms. See, e.g., Emma Aisbett & Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen, Relative Treatment of Aliens:
Firm-level Evidence from Developing Countries 1 (Glob. Econ. Governance Programme
Working Paper No. 122, 2016).
19.
Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Reform) on the Work of its Thirty-Eighth Session, ¶¶ 102–104, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9
/1004 (July 6–17, 2020).
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A. Rationale for Our Proposal
The argument for our proposal rests on three central claims. First, we
argue that investment treaties should be designed to ensure that becoming
20
and remaining party to a treaty benefits each state party. If investment treaties did not increase welfare of all state parties to them, disadvantaged states
would have no reason to voluntarily become or remain parties to such trea21
ties, and the regime would prove unstable in the medium to long term. Indeed, one of the reasons for the instability we are presently seeing in the
current regime is that many developing countries have real doubts about
22
whether continuing to participate in investment treaties is in their interests.
This first claim has significant implications for our analysis. Bilateral investment treaties were historically negotiated between developed and developing countries, and many investment treaties continue to govern bilateral
23
relationships in which investment flows are highly asymmetric. In practi-

20.
Our approach is consistent with the view of some scholars. See, e.g., James R.
Markusen, Commitment to Rules on Investment: The Developing Countries’ Stake 9 R. INT’L
ECON. 287, 292–293, 300–01 (2001); Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Investment Treaty Law and the
Fear for Sovereignty: Transnational Challenges and Solutions, 78 MOD. L. REV. 793, 793,
810 (2015). It contrasts with the view of other scholars, who argue that investment treaties
should be evaluated from an aggregate global welfare perspective, regardless of whether some
states are left worse off. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, The Once and Future Foreign Investment
Regime, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF
MICHAEL REISMAN 634, 635 (Mahnoush Arsanjani, Jacob Katz Cogan, Robert Sloane &
Siegfried Wiessner eds., 2011); Roberts, supra note 5, at 378–80.
21.
In the law and economics literature this is termed states’ “participation constraint.”
See Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A
Contract Theory Analysis, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 515 (2009). There is ample evidence that
states are already questioning their participation in the investment treaty regime.
22.
Poulsen and Aisbett show that the rate at which developing states enter into new
investment treaties slows markedly following their first experience as respondent in an investment treaty arbitration. See Lauge Poulsen & Emma Aisbett, When the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning 65 WORLD POL. 273, 286 (2013).
Some developing states, such as South Africa and India, have gone further and terminated
existing investment treaties. See Fabio Morosini & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, An Introduction, in RECONCEPTUALIZING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FROM THE GLOBAL
SOUTH 4, 19–21 (Fabio Morosini & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin eds., 2018).
23.
The world’s largest bilateral investment relationships are between pairs of developed countries and are characterized by significant flows of investment in both directions.
Most such investment relationships are not covered by investment treaties. For example, only
one of Germany’s ten largest bilateral investment relationships is covered by an investment
treaty. Following the entry into force of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, only
one of the United States’ largest ten investment relationships is covered by an investment treaty and that coverage (of the U.S.-Mexico relationship) is partial. Notwithstanding some notable exceptions, the majority of the world’s investment treaties are bilateral treaties that govern
the relationship between a developed and a developing country. Jonathan Bonnitcha, Lauge
Poulsen & Jason Yackee, A Future Without (Treaty-Based) ISDS: Costs and Benefits, in
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: DEMISE OR TRANSFORMATION?
(Manfred Elsig, Rodrigo Polanco & Peter van den Bossche eds., forthcoming 2021).
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cal terms, this means that such treaties are only justified if they benefit state
parties that are predominantly host states.
Second, we elucidate that investment treaties, as they are currently
drafted, address two conceptually distinct economic problems. The first is
time inconsistency of the host state’s optimal policy toward the investment
—a host state at least theoretically has an incentive to offer attractive conditions to new foreign investment and then renege on the bargain once the investment has been made. An example is a state that grants a foreign investor
a concession to build and operate a mine and then seizes possession of the
mine once construction is complete. The second is a broader problem that
the host state may undervalue foreign investors’ interests when responding
to new information throughout the life cycle of the investment. New information, as we understand it, encompasses a diverse range of changing circumstances, including new knowledge about an investment’s impacts,
changes in commodity prices and underlying shifts in citizens’ political
24
preferences. All these events may encourage a state to change the way it
regulates foreign investment in ways that look superficially similar to conduct driven by time inconsistency. Yet, such cases differ conceptually from
situations of time inconsistency. In “pure” cases of new information, the
host state does not benefit from inducing the investment and then changing
the regulatory arrangements governing it. An example is a state that gives a
foreign investor permission to commence the construction of a mine and
then shuts the project down, citing its unacceptable environmental impacts.
The state has gained nothing by allowing and then cancelling this investment.
Complications arise because problems of time inconsistency and new
information are intertwined in common fact scenarios. Consider, for example, the situation in which a host state sells a foreign investor a concession
to build and operate a mine and, subsequently, cancels the concession, citing
unacceptable environmental impacts arising from the mine’s operation. One
of the major contributions of our companion paper is the development of a
mathematical model that formalizes and clarifies the relationship between
problems of time inconsistency and new information and shows how the
two problems can be intertwined in a variety of complex fact scenarios.
Third, we show that solving problems of time inconsistency benefits
both home and host states by encouraging foreign investors to proceed with
mutually beneficial investment projects. In contrast, investment treaties that
constrain states’ discretion to respond to new information can leave host
states worse off, overall. While such treaties may encourage additional investment, our companion paper shows that, for several common factual scenarios, any benefit of such additional investment is outweighed by the risk

24.
See van Aaken, supra note 21, at 517; Henrik Horn & Thomas Tangeårs, Economics and Politics of International Investment Agreements (Rsch. Inst. for Indus. Econ., IFN
Working Paper No. 1140, 2016).
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the host state assumes in agreeing to indemnify investors for actions taken
in response to new information.
On this basis, we argue that investment treaties should be designed and
interpreted to provide the minimum protection to foreign investment necessary to solve time inconsistency problems for the host state. Using the tools
of law and economics, we develop a proposal that is capable of fully solving
problems of time inconsistency without constraining states’ ability to respond to new information. We propose that a state should only have to
compensate the investor if it breaches or modifies the domestic legal regime
governing the investment and that compensation should be the lesser of the
investor’s loss and the host state’s gain from the host state not having had
the new legal regime in place when the investment was made. We show that
our proposal increases both host and home state welfare across a diverse array of fact scenarios compared to a counter-factual where there is no investment treaty.

B. Key Concepts: Explaining Our Proposal
To understand how our proposal would operate in practice, and how it
compares to existing jurisprudence, it is necessary to recall the definitions of
our conceptual building blocks, which are set out in the companion paper.
The first of these is our concept of “the domestic legal regime.” We use this
concept to capture the terms on which a host state allows foreign investment
to take place in its territory. Our conception of the “domestic legal regime”
is broad; it does not depend on the designation of the instruments involved
under the law of the host state, so long as they create binding rights and obligations. As such, the domestic legal regime is a composite concept that includes the provisions of any contract negotiated between the foreign investor and the host, as well as the powers of the host state to tax and regulate
the investment under laws in force at the time the investment is made. The
investment’s operating licenses—including any pre-specified taxes, charges,
or royalty payments—also comprise part of the host state’s domestic legal
regime. The domestic legal regime, as it relates to an investment, would ordinarily cover issues such as the permissible uses of land and other assets,
mandatory regulatory requirements, and tax, royalty, and pricing arrangements. Our conception of the domestic legal regime does not, however, include expectations or plans a foreign investor may have (or may claim to
have) unless those expectations are grounded in the law of the host state. In
Part IV we will see that this is a significant point of difference with existing
investment treaties, which have been interpreted to protect an investor’s legitimate expectations, without requiring that those expectations be grounded
25
in legal entitlements.

25.
For a typology of legitimate expectations, see Michele Potestà, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and Limits of a Controversial Concept, 28 ICSID REV., 88, 100–19 (2013); see also JONATHAN BONNITCHA, SUBSTANTIVE
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Because the rationale of our proposal is to solve problems of time inconsistency for the host state, some breach or change of the domestic legal
regime that was in place when the investment was made is a necessary condition for compensation to be required. But it is not a sufficient condition. If
this threshold condition is met, our proposal then requires a tribunal to consider the situation that would have existed if the new domestic legal regime
—or, in cases in which the host has breached rather than changed its own
laws, a domestic legal regime that permitted such breaches—were already
in place before the investment was originally made. This involves an exercise in counter-factual reasoning. Existing principles governing compensation under investment treaties also require tribunals to engage in counterfactual reasoning, but the relevant counter-factual under existing jurisprudence is different: the situation that would have existed but for the host
state’s conduct of which the investor complains.
Compensation, under our proposal, is the lesser of the investor’s loss
and the host state’s gain compared to the situation that would have existed if
the new domestic legal regime was in place before the investment was originally made. In many situations, it will be uncontroversial that one or other
of these amounts is zero, in which case no compensation is required and no
further analysis is needed. For example, consider a host state’s unilateral reduction to contractually agreed tariffs paid to an investment in the utility
sector. Such a change will inevitability reduce the investment’s profitability.
But, if the investor would have made its investment anyway, even if the reduced tariff rates had been in place from the outset, it has not suffered a loss
that is compensable under our proposal. Notwithstanding the host state’s
unilateral action, in this situation, the investor is still better off than if it had
not invested and, therefore, has not suffered any loss as a result of its reliance on the original contractually agreed tariffs.
In other scenarios the relevant gain to the host state will be zero, and no
further inquiry is needed. The case of a state that shuts down a mine due to
its environmental impacts is an example. Absent some additional factor,
such as payments by the investor to the state or the construction of dual-use
infrastructure that is subsequently repurposed by the state, a state gains
nothing by allowing and then cancelling an investment. In this way, our
proposal distinguishes between loss arising from regulatory change, which
is a risk that investors should be required to bear, and the seizure of an investor’s assets by a state, which is compensable.
In situations where neither figure is zero, our proposal requires some
compensation. A more complex valuation exercise is then needed to determine the amount of compensation. Nevertheless, calculation of compensation under our proposal is still likely to be simpler than calculation of compensation under existing jurisprudence. The evidence required to determine

PROTECTION UNDER INVESTMENT TREATIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 169
(2014).
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compensation under our proposal will include documentation of amounts
the investor has actually paid to the state in order to obtain permits and concessions, costs actually incurred by the investor in making the investment,
valuation of any assets or resources transferred into state ownership during
the lifespan of the investment, and income earned by the investor up to the
date of the dispute. Note that the evidence required to calculate compensation under our proposal relates largely to actual events in the past for which
reliable evidence is normally available. In contrast, existing jurisprudence
requires a tribunal to make and justify a complex set of interlocking forecasts about the future financial situation the investor would have been in but
for the host state’s breach of the investment treaty. We return to these practical benefits of our proposal as compared to the status quo in Part IV.

III. THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE USE/REGULATION
DISTINCTION
Our proposal builds on a line of a scholarship that has grappled with a
similar intuition to that which animates our proposal—that government seizure of private property differs from government regulation of private property, and that compensation should be paid only in the case of the former.
Foundational contributions to this literature have focused on the protection
26
of private property from government “taking” under the U.S. Constitution.
The national constitutional context differs from an investment treaty context
in certain respects. In particular, all costs and benefits associated with constitutional protection of private property are presumptively internal to the
state in question, which means that our application of the Pareto criterion
27
would not necessarily play out in the same way in a constitutional context.
Nevertheless, debates about the protection of private property under the
U.S. Constitution remain an important point of reference, both because key
provisions of investment treaties are a codification of U.S. constitutional
28
doctrine, and because other influential scholars in the field take these de29
bates as their starting point for an analysis of investment treaties. In this
section we trace the development of the use/regulation distinction as an al26.
The fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides “nor shall private property
be taken for public use without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27.
Institutional considerations in the United States also differ somewhat from international investment law. See, e.g., WILLIAM A FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995). Fischel’s account of takings jurisprudence turns largely
on differences in the decision-making between local government and national government.
The relationship between our proposal and institutional considerations that are specific to the
investment treaty regime is considered infra Part V.
28.
See infra Section IV.A.
29.
Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1435, 1469 (2000); Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment?
NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory
Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 78 (2003).
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ternative to balancing techniques. We also draw attention to some significant challenges that have complicated attempts to build a coherent jurisprudence on the use/regulation distinction.
In the mid-twentieth century, U.S. constitutional jurisprudence on the
protection of private property was widely regarded as inconsistent and lacking any underlying theoretical justification. At the time, there were three
mutually inconsistent threads in jurisprudence, each with its own prob30
lems. The first approach required compensation whenever government ac31
tion entailed physical possession or occupation of private property. But the
application of this principle led to bizarre results—notably that trivial incursions into physical property would require compensation, while severe inter32
ference with intangible property rights would be non-compensable. The
second approach required compensation when government action sought to
33
secure some public benefit but not when it aimed to prevent a harm. But
this test suffered from indeterminacy. Prevention of almost any harm can be
reframed as creation of a public benefit—for example, prevention of pollu34
tion could be understood as promoting a clean environment. The third approach required compensation whenever government action led to a signifi35
cant diminution of the value of private property. But this test suffered from
indeterminacy of a different sort. If a government expropriated ten acres of
land from a 100 acre bloc, should this be understood as a minor diminution
in the value of the 100 acre bloc, or a complete destruction of the value of
36
the expropriated portion? The third test also cut against lawyers and policy-makers’ intuitions about the contours of a fair takings jurisprudence, in

30.
See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964); Jed
Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1088 (1993); Been & Beauvais, supra note 29, at
59–61.
31.
Sax, supra note 30, at 46; Rubenfeld, supra note 30, at 1083 (citing Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871) and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419 (1982) as examples).
32.
Sax, supra note 30, at 46–47.
33.
Sax, supra note 30, at 48; Rubenfeld, supra note 30, at 1085 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)).
34.
Glynn S. Lunney Jr., Responsibility, Causation, and the Harm-Benefit Line in Takings Jurisprudence, 6 FORDHAM ENV’T L.J. 433, 435 (1995); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
35.
Sax, supra note 30, at 50; Rubenfeld supra note 30, at 1086–87 (citing Pa. Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1992)).
36.
“The underlying conceptual problem is that, ‘to the extent that any portion of property is taken, that portion is always taken in its entirety.’ ” Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002) (citing Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal.,
Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993)). For discussion of
this problem in an investment treaty context, see Vaughan Lowe, Changing Dimensions of
International Investment Law 62–64 (Oxford Legal Studs. Rsch. Paper No. 4, 2007);
SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION 268 (2009);
BONNITCHA, supra note 25, at 236–37.
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that it would require compensation in situations where a property owner
complains of otherwise-lawful government action that the owner knew was
likely to occur when it acquired the property in question.
Modern legal scholarship takes these problems with mid-twentieth century jurisprudence as its starting point. In response, two general approaches
to reformulation were proposed in the academic literature. The first argued
that determining whether government interference with private property requires compensation inevitably involves weighing and balancing of a range
of competing factors and sought to provide a framework to guide such exercises in balancing. In an influential 1967 article, Frank Michelman argued
that determining the appropriate level of protection of private property re37
quired the weighing of all the private and social costs involved. In the
Penn Central decision, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a version of
Michelman’s proposal, noting that the following factors would need to be
balanced: “The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So,
38
too, is the character of the governmental action.”
Other frameworks for organizing balancing inquiries were influential
elsewhere. For example, in resolving claims of the violation of the right to
property, the European Court of Human Rights mandates a balancing in39
quiry organized around the concept of proportionality. Scholars such as
Robert Alexy have subsequently explored and clarified the conceptual
foundations of proportionality as an organizing principle for a structured
40
balancing inquiry.
A second response to the problems with takings jurisprudence was to
suggest that a distinction could be drawn between different types of government conduct. In a seminal article in the Yale Law Journal, Joseph Sax
proposed a “distinction between the role of government as participant and
the government as mediator in the process of competition among competing

37.
Michelman argued that a full accounting of costs and benefits could be organized
under the headings of “efficiency gains,” “demoralization costs,” and “settlement costs.”
Frank Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
“Just Compensation” Law, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967). Michelman’s framework
has been heavily criticized, including by other proponents of balancing. See, e.g., Robert
Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1,
21–22 (1985).
38.
Penn Central Transp. Co v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
39.
Tom Allen, Compensation for Property Under the European Convention on Human
Rights, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 287, 294 (2007); see also Yves Winisdoerffer, Margin of Appreciation and Article 1 of Protocol No 1, 19 HUM. RTS. L.J. 18, 19 (1998). For an example of
the methodology see Sporrong v. Sweden, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 21, ¶ 73 (1982).
40.
ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 66–67 (Julian Rivers
trans., 2002); see also, KAI MÖLLER, THE GLOBAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 13–
15 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012); AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 3–4 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
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41

economics [interests].” He argued that compensation should be required
whenever government acts in the former enterprise capacity, but not when it
acts in the latter capacity as a mediator between competing private interests.
The application of this distinction leads to different results than balancing
tests. Under Sax’s approach, compensation will always be required when
the government acquires resources from a private actor—for example, pencils for use in government agencies—even when the value of the resources
acquired is low and there is clear public interest justification for their acquisition. In contrast, it suggests that regulatory action—for example, pollution
control legislation—should not be compensable, even when that action is
unexpected and leads to severe economic loss for specific private actors.
Sax’s argument was based on a theory that government acting in its enterprise capacity has incentives to interfere with private property for the
benefit of the state itself, which are absent when government acts as a medi42
ator. Subsequent scholars further developed Sax’s argument, arguing that
protecting private property from government acting in its capacity as a mediator is unlikely to improve government conduct, even if one assumes that
governments are prone to mediate between interests in ways that are unfair
and arbitrary. For example, Susan Rose-Ackerman and Jim Rossi argue that
imposing legal obligations on government to pay compensation for interference with private property is unlikely to redress government dysfunction in
mediating between private interests because the burden of compensation ultimately falls on taxpayers, rather than government decision-makers them43
selves. Vicki Been and Joel C. Beauvais put forward that extending legal
protection to private property from action taken by the government in its capacity as mediator fails to redress a dysfunctional government’s hypothesized indifference to the benefits that regulatory actions create for various
44
constituencies, leading to excessive caution on the part of government.
These arguments strengthen the case for focusing constitutional protection
of private property exclusively on disciplining government action in its enterprise capacity. We return to their relevance for the drafting of investment
treaties in Part V.
Although Sax’s proposal was not adopted in U.S. law, his ideas are reflected in jurisprudence elsewhere. Under Australian constitutional jurisprudence, for example, government interference with private property is only
45
compensable if it constitutes an acquisition of that property. Under Canadian statutory protections of private property, compensation is only required
for regulatory action if there has been an appropriation of a property interest

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
(Austl.).

Sax, supra note 30, at 62.
Sax, supra note 30, at 61–64.
Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 29, at 1482.
Been & Beauvais, supra note 29, at 96–100.
Georgiadis v Australian & Overseas Telecomms Corp (1994) 179 CLR 297
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46

by the state itself. These examples are important, in that they show that a
jurisprudence organized around the distinction between government action
in its enterprise and in its mediator capacity represents a genuine, practical
alternative approach to a jurisprudence organized around the balancing of
competing interests.
We share the intuition that animates Sax’s account. However, his argument was not based on any underlying economic analysis of the problem of
time inconsistency, which led to several difficulties. First, it assumed that
the distinction between government acting in an enterprise capacity and in a
mediator capacity was self-evident, without proposing a means for drawing
47
the line between the two categories. Subsequent scholars recognized this
challenge, but still continued to assume that cases could be classified as in48
volving government acting in either one or other capacity. Second, Sax’s
approach seemed to suggest that any increase in tax rates should be fully
49
compensable, a conclusion which he rightly regarded as untenable.
In a 1993 article, Jed Rubenfeld sought to address the former problem
by recasting the distinction as one between government “use” and “regula50
tion” of private property, with only the former requiring compensation. To
distinguish between government use and government regulation of property,
he proposed that interference with private property would not amount to a
compensable use if the state’s interest would be “equally well served by destroying that thing altogether.” But Rubenfeld’s approach creates anomalies,
51
particularly when applied to intangible property. His approach would re-

46.
Bryan P Schwartz & Melanie R Bueckert, Regulatory Takings in Canada, 5 WASH.
UNIV. GLOB. STUDS. L. REV. 477, 488 (2006); Matthew C. Porterfield, State Practice and the
(Purported) Obligation Under Customary International Law to Provide Compensation for
Regulatory Expropriations, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 159, 179 (2011); Andrew Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law, 20 ICSID REV. 1,
8–9 (2005).
47.
Sax’s most precise statement of his rule is as follows:
When an individual or limited group in society sustains a detriment to legally acquired existing economic values as a consequence of government activity which
enhances the economic value of some government enterprise, then the act is a taking, and compensation is constitutionally required; but when the challenged act is
an improvement of the public condition through resolution of conflict within the
private sector of the society, compensation is not constitutionally required.
Sax, supra note 30, at 67. This rule turns on the concept of “government enterprise,” which is
illustrated with examples but never defined.
48.
Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 29, at 1478. Other scholars have argued that
this challenge proves that recourse to balancing techniques is inevitable. See MONTT, supra
note 36, at 191–98, 237–42.
49.
Sax, supra note 30, at 75–76.
50.
Rubenfeld, supra note 30, at 1116.
51.
Rubenfeld rejected the consequentialist approach of law and economics. Rubenfeld,
supra note 30, at 1131–34. Yet, engaging more deeply with the insights of law and economics
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quire compensation if the government sells public land to an investor and
then renationalizes the land the following day, but not if the government
sells an investor a concession to operate a mobile phone network on a designated spectrum and then cancels the concession the following day, having
52
pocketed the sale price. Been and Beauvais’s argument that investment
treaties should constrain only physical seizure or assumption of control of
53
foreign investment suffers from the same problem.
In an important 2009 article on the drafting and interpretation of investment treaties, Anne van Aaken puts the use/regulation distinction on a
firmer conceptual footing by drawing attention to the underlying distinction
between government conduct that is opportunistic and government conduct
54
that responds to new information. She argues that government conduct
should only be compensable if it is opportunistic. We agree. But van Aaken
left three significant challenges posed by the insight unaddressed. First, she
assumes that state conduct can be classified as either opportunistic or as responding to new information. Second, discussion of the principles governing compensation under investment treaties is not integrated into her analysis, notwithstanding that the consequences of breach are essential to
economic analysis of the ex ante effects of legal rules. Third, her approach
requires tribunals to determine, after the fact, whether impugned conduct
55
was a response to information that was genuinely “new.” She rightly rec56
ognized that this task poses immense practical difficulties. In the following
section, we show how our proposal addresses and resolves all three challenges.

might have encouraged him to develop an approach that treated functionally similar cases
similarly, regardless of their formal designation.
52.
Such cases have proved consistently difficult for courts in countries, such as Australia and Canada, where constitutional protection of private property turns on whether there
has been an acquisition or appropriation of private property. See, e.g., Newcrest Mining (WA)
Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 514 (Austl.); Newcombe, supra note 46, at 46. Newcombe’s proposed solution is that compensation should be required when state conduct annuls
or otherwise destroys “contractual commitment or authorization upon which an investor relied.” However, this solution would require compensation in cases where state conduct that
would otherwise be classified as “regulatory” interferes with contractual rights. It would also
lead to an anomaly in that contractual rights would benefit from greater legal protection than
rights of ownership in relation to physical property. To date, doctrines developed by such
courts to address the issue have been ad hoc and unconvincing. See, e.g., ICM Agric Pty v
Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140, ¶ 149 (Austl.).
53.
Been & Beauvais, supra note 29, at 142.
54.
van Aaken, supra note 21, at 517–19.
55.
Id. at 526.
56.
Id. at 526.
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IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION AND PRINCIPLES
GOVERNING COMPENSATION
In this section we examine how our proposal compares to existing jurisprudence under investment treaties. We begin with a brief review of investment treaties as they are currently drafted and interpreted. We show that
the application of core investment treaty protections requires tribunals to
engage in the balancing of competing interests. If the host state is found to
have breached one of these protections, compensation equals the loss the
investor has suffered compared to a future counter-factual in which the host
state has not breached the treaty. Having clarified the status quo, we examine how our proposal differs, using case examples to illustrate. This exercise
also demonstrates that our proposal is feasible, in that it relies on information and legal techniques that are available and familiar to arbitral tribunals. Finally, we show how our proposal resolves many of the practical
challenges associated with both the status quo and with plausible alternatives, including the three challenges associated with previous attempts to
operationalize the use/regulation distinction that we identified in Part III.

A. The Status Quo: Investment Treaties as Currently Drafted and
Interpreted
1. Substantive Protection: “Balancing” as a Mode of Reasoning
As currently drafted, investment treaties grant a common suite of legal
protections to foreign investment. These include guarantees of compensation for expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, and compliance with
contractual obligations that the host state has incurred in relation to the investment. These core standards are sometimes described as “absolute” protections, in the sense that the extent of the host state’s obligations does not
57
depend on how domestic investment is treated.
Investment treaties also contain “relative” provisions guaranteeing nondiscriminatory treatment to foreign investment, as well as provisions that
guarantee minimum standards of due process in adjudicative proceedings
58
within the host state’s legal system. Such provisions are much less likely

57.
Catherine Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International
Investment Law 2 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv. No. 3, 2004).
58.
One complication is that the general obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment (“FET”) to foreign investment is normally understood to incorporate a minimum guarantee of due process in adjudicative proceedings as one of the constituent “elements” of the general obligation. For example, USMCA, supra note 4, art. 14.6(2)(a) reads “fair and equitable
treatment includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world.” This treaty language is widely understood to incorporate the
customary international law doctrine of denial of justice into the FET standard. However, in
practice, few claims that a state has breached the FET standard turn on an allegation of denial
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to constitute the basis for ISDS claims against host states. While our proposal may also have implications for the reform of treaty provisions dealing
60
with discrimination and due process, in this section we focus on its implications for reform of investment treaties’ core absolute standards, which
give rise to the majority of investment treaty disputes. These guarantees are
normally drafted in vague language, the meaning and implications of which
has been established through interpretation and application by arbitral tribunals.
The most important substantive protection contained in investment treaties is the guarantee of fair and equitable treatment (“FET”). This provision
is both the clause that foreign investors invoke most frequently in arbitration
61
and the one with which they have the highest rate of success. Tribunals’
interpretations of FET provisions are not entirely consistent. Tribunals have
held, variously, that FET provisions protect investors from conduct that is
unreasonable, disproportionate, or inconsistent with investors’ legitimate

of justice. For detailed discussion of the doctrine of denial of justice, see JAN PAULSSON,
DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
59.
For example, UNCTAD statistics show that breach of an investment treaty’s FET
provision has been alleged in 449 cases; breach of an investment treaty’s indirect expropriation provision has been alleged in 412 cases; and breach of an umbrella clause has been alleged in 143 cases. In contrast, breach of national treatment provisions has been alleged in
only 134 cases, and only nine such claims have been successful. See Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org
/investment-dispute-settlement (last visited May 27, 2020).
60.
In principle, our proposal is capable of subsuming investment treaties’ guarantees
of due process and non-discriminatory treatment. With respect to due process, the logic of our
proposal is that investment treaties should function as devices that allow states to credibly
commit to observing whatever level of procedural fairness that state has chosen to offer to
foreign investment as a matter of law. With respect to non-discriminatory treatment, the logic
of our proposal is that there should not be any freestanding prohibition on discriminatory
treatment. Discriminatory treatment would sometimes require compensation under our rule,
but only to the extent the host state’s conduct was opportunistic and therefore captured by the
normal operation of our rule. In this way, our proposal would avoid many of the conceptual
challenges facing existing jurisprudence on de facto discrimination - notably, the challenge in
determining whether any difference in the burden of complying with a government measure
between investors is justified by the host state’s policy objective. For discussion of these conceptual challenges, see ANDREW D. MITCHELL, DAVID HEATON & CAROLINE HENCKELS,
NON-DISCRIMINATION AND THE ROLE OF REGULATORY PURPOSE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND INVESTMENT LAW 141 (2016) (citing AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Republic of
Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, ¶ 10.3.9 (Sept. 23, 2010), http:
//icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C114/DC1730_En.pdf). While
noting these implications of our proposal, we also note that there are arguments in support of
existing guarantees of due process and non-discriminatory treatment beyond those that we
consider in this paper. For this reason, we do not take a position on whether these more radical
reforms of investment treaties would be desirable.
61.
Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, supra note 59; BONNITCHA ET AL., supra
note 1.
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expectations. Notwithstanding differences between the various “elements”
of the FET standard, these doctrines all require tribunals to balance the harm
state conduct causes to the foreign investor against other policy justifica63
tions for the state’s action. In this sense, they all require tribunals to adopt
the same mode of reasoning.
Balancing as a mode of reasoning is most explicit in decisions evaluating the proportionality of state conduct under FET provisions. For example,
in emphasizing that host states retain relatively broad discretion to regulate
foreign investment, the tribunal in Electrabel v. Hungary explained that the
boundaries of that discretion were to be charted through the balancing of
competing interests:
[T]he Tribunal considers that the application of the [Energy Charter
Treaty’s] FET standard allows for a balancing exercise by the host
State in appropriate circumstances. The host State is not required to
elevate unconditionally the interests of the foreign investor above
all other considerations in every circumstance. As was decided by
the tribunals in Saluka v Czech Republic and Arif v Moldova, an
FET standard may legitimately involve a balancing or weighing exercise by the host State. . . .
. . . [“T]here needs to be an appropriate correlation between the
state’s public policy objective and the measure adopted to achieve
it. This has to do with the nature of the measure and the way it is
implemented.” In the Tribunal’s view, this includes the requirement
that the impact of the measure on the investor be proportional to the

62.
The challenges of providing an internally consistent account of existing FET jurisprudence have been explored in detail in the academic literature. These challenges are reflected by the fact that, while almost all commentators agree that it is useful to divide FET jurisprudence into decisions dealing with different “elements” of the standard, no two text writers
propose an identical system of classification. See ANDREW PAUL NEWCOMBE & LLUIS
PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 275 (2009); DOLZER &
SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 145; IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
STANDARD IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 154 (2008); JESWALD
SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 218 (2010); KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE,
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 190, 234 (2010); CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE
SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE
PRINCIPLES 226 (2007); RONALD KLÄGER, ‘FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT’ IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 117–18 (2011); BONNITCHA, supra note 25, at 163.
63.
Academic scholarship recognizes that arbitral decisions applying the FET standard
engage in balancing. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest—the
Concept of Proportionality, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE
PUBLIC LAW 75 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010); CAROLINE HENCKELS, PROPORTIONALITY
AND DEFENCE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION (James Crawford & John S. Bell eds.,
2015); David Gaukrodger, Addressing the Balance of Interests in Investment Treaties: The
Limitation of Fair and Equitable Treatment Provisions to the Minimum Standard of Treatment Under Customary International Law (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv. No. 3, 2017).
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policy objective sought. The relevance of the proportionality of the
measure has been increasingly addressed by investment tribunals
and other international tribunals, including the ECtHR. The test for
proportionality has been developed from certain municipal administrative laws, and requires the measure to be suitable to achieve a
legitimate policy objective, necessary for that objective, and not
excessive considering the relative weight of each interest in64
volved.
Subsequent decisions have endorsed these statements in principle, while applying such balancing tests in a way that is arguably more favorable to the
investor. For example, in Novenergia v. Spain, the tribunal held that “the
assessment of whether the FET standard has been breached is a balancing
exercise, where the state’s regulatory interests are weighed against the in65
vestors’ legitimate expectations and reliance.”
Balancing also underpins the influential doctrine of legitimate expectations. For example, in Duke Energy v. Ecuador, the tribunal explained that
FET standard protects expectations derived from “conditions that the State
offered the investor” at the time an investment was made. To determine
whether an expectation is legitimate—i.e. whether its violation triggers the
liability of the host state—a tribunal “must take into account all circumstances, including not only the facts surrounding the investment, but also the
political, socioeconomic, cultural, and historical conditions prevailing in the
66
host State.” To assess whether the host state breached the investor’s legitimate expectations, tribunals routinely weigh the investor’s interest in the
67
stability of government policy against the state’s regulatory objectives.
The tribunal in Oostergetel v. Slovakia summarized the doctrine simply, in
the following terms: “legitimate expectations must be measured through a
68
balancing test taking account of specific circumstances.”
Other common substantive protections found in investment treaties require tribunals to engage in balancing as a mode of reasoning. Many recent
investment treaties explicitly instruct tribunals to engage in a balancing ex-

64.
Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Award, ¶¶ 165,
179 (Nov. 25, 2015), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C111
/DC7353_En.pdf.
65.
Novenergia II—Energy and Env’t (SCA) (Grand Duchy of Lux.), SICAR v. Kingdom of Spain, Arb. Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Com. [SCC] Case No. 2015/063, Final
Arbitral Award, 30 World Trade & Arb. Materials 947, ¶ 694 (2018).
66.
Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB
/04/19, Award, ¶ 340 (Aug. 18, 2008), 20 World Trade & Arb. Materials 189 (Dec. 2008).
67.
See, e.g., Saluka Invs. BV (The Neth.) v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, 18
World Trade & Arb. Materials 169, ¶ 306 (UNCITRAL, June 2006); Total S.A. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, ¶ 309 (Dec. 27, 2010), http:
//icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C30/DC7833_En.pdf.
68.
Oostergetel v. The Slovak Republic, Final Award, ¶ 224 (UNCITRAL, 2012),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0933.pdf.
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ercise to determine whether a compensable indirect expropriation has occurred. For example, treaties based on the 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) contains the following clarification of the concept
of indirect expropriation, which is based on U.S. Supreme Court’s Penn
Central decision:
The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a
Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers,
among other factors:
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the
fact that an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse
effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone,
does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred;
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with
distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and
(iii) the character of the government action.

69

Tribunals and commentators have understood this clarification as requiring
a particular form of structured balancing inquiry: one that weighs the measure’s adverse impact on the investment and the extent to which the investor
had relied on the legal regime that existed prior to the measure against po70
tential justifications for the measure. Similar clarifications have disseminated widely beyond U.S. treaty practice, and are now found in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Comprehensive Investment Agreement, the
Canada-European Union Trade Agreement, and the China-Japan-Korea In71
vestment Treaty, among others. Even in cases where the relevant investment treaty does not explicitly clarify the meaning of indirect expropriation,

69.
Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative [USTR], U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, Annex B (2004).
70.
See Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Final Award, 48 I.L.M. 1038, ¶ 356
(UNCITRAL, 2009); Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14
/21, Award, ¶ 377 (Nov. 30, 2017), 30 World Trade & Arb. Materials 5 (2018); L. Yves Fortier (CC, QC) & Stephen L. Drymer, Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I Know It When I See It, or Caveat Investor, 13 ASIA PAC. L. REV., 79, 100 (2005); Rachel Esdall, Indirect Expropriation Under NAFTA and DR-CAFTA: Potential Inconsistencies
in the Treatment of State Public Welfare Regulations, 86 B.U. L. REV. 931, 957 (2006);
BONNITCHA, supra note 25, at 263–70.
71.
See Association of Southeast Asian Nations Comprehensive Investment Agreement, annex II, Feb. 26, 2008, https://asean.org/asean-economic-community/aseaninvestment-area-aia-council; CETA, supra note 10, annex VIII; Protocol to the Investment
Promotion and Protection Agreement between Japan, Republic of Korea, and China art. 2,
May 13, 2012, https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/5/pdfs/0513_01_01.pdf.
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tribunals have used balancing techniques to determine whether a compensa72
ble indirect expropriation has occurred.
The key conclusion that emerges from the foregoing review of existing
jurisprudence is that, to determine whether the host state has breached
common substantive protections in investment treaties, arbitral tribunals
frequently balance the interests of the investor against those of the host
state. It is important to attach some caveats to this conclusion. First, we recognize that there are diverse legal techniques to balance competing interests.
Often the choice of one technique over another will be decisive in a particu73
lar case. For example, in Philip Morris v. Uruguay, the dissenting arbitrator argued that the FET provision placed a more demanding burden of justi74
fication on the host state than that accepted by the majority. On this basis,
the dissenting arbitrator would have found that Uruguay had breached the
investment treaty. Second, we recognize that not all disputes under investment treaties require a tribunal to engage in balancing. For example, tribunals have resolved claims under umbrella clauses by determining the host
state had breached an underlying investment contract. This requires the tribunal to apply the law governing the underlying contract, normally the law
75
of the host state itself. Our claim is not that tribunals engage in balancing
in every investment treaty dispute, but rather that the majority of investment
treaty disputes across a range of common treaty provisions require tribunals
76
to engage in some form of balancing of competing interests. This conclusion is important, as one of the key features of our proposal is that it does
not require tribunals to engage in balancing.

2. Prospective, Loss-Based Compensation
Investment treaties, as they are currently drafted, only explicitly address
the amount of compensation due in the event of an expropriation. The basic
principle, contained in almost every investment treaty, is that compensation

72.
See, e.g., Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 189
(Oct. 3, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 36 (2006); PL Holdings S.à.r.l. v. Republic of Poland, SCC Case No.
V2014/163, Partial Award, ¶ 355 (2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw9378.pdf.
73.
Indeed, much of the debate among legal scholars can be understood as a debate
about which forms/techniques of balancing are appropriate in different circumstances.
74.
Compare Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switz.) v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 305 (Jul. 8, 2016), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid
/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C1000/DC9012_En.pdf, with id. ¶ 150 (Arb. Born, dissenting).
75.
See, e.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, Art. X(2) (Jan. 29, 2004),
8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005).
76.
Moreover, we show that some of most controversial and problematic cases are
those in which tribunals have been engaged in balancing. See infra Section IV.C.2.ii.
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should equal the fair market value of the expropriated investment. The fair
market value of an investment is the amount that a willing buyer would pay
a willing seller for the investment in an arm’s length transaction immediate77
ly before the expropriation took place. Conceptually, the fair market value
of an investment, as a revenue-generating asset, reflects the risk-adjusted
78
present value of the future net revenue stream of that investment. Fair
market value differs conceptually from other measures of compensation,
such as the costs the investor has incurred in making or acquiring the investment, although tribunals have occasionally calculated compensation on
79
this basis when there is insufficient evidence to estimate its future revenue.
Investment treaties do not clarify the amount of compensation due for
breaches of the treaties’ other substantive provisions. (And, technically, the
fair market-value standard only applies insofar as compensation is paid
promptly at the time of expropriation, which is invariably not the case in
80
claims that are litigated in investment treaty arbitration.) In the absence of
textual guidance, tribunals have looked to the wider principles of customary
81
international law. On this basis, tribunals have consistently applied the
principle that compensation should provide “full reparation” by restoring
the investor to the position it would have been in “but for” the breach of the
82
treaty. There are differences between the “full reparation” and “fair market
83
value” principles that, in certain fact scenarios, could be significant. However, in most fact scenarios, the application of the two sets of principles
84
leads to similar, or even identical, results. For present purpose, the basic

77.
See, e.g., Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative [USTR], U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 6(2), (2012); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/8, Final Award, ¶ 402 (May 12, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1205 (2005).
78.
DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 297.
79.
See, e.g., Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, ¶¶ 123–
125 (Dec. 8, 2000), 41 I.L.M. 933 (2002).
80.
Expropriations that are not carried out consistently with investment treaties’ requirements, including the requirement of prompt payment of compensation, are sometimes
termed “unlawful” expropriations. See, e.g., ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID
Case No ARB/03/16, Award (Oct. 2, 2006), 18 World Trade & Arb. Materials 285 (Dec.
2006). For discussion and criticism of the lawful/unlawful expropriation distinction, see Ratner, supra note 11.
81.
In the legal literature, the term “damages” is often used to distinguish the principles
governing compensation owed for breach of an investment treaty from those governing compensation for an expropriation carried out in accordance with the treaty’s provisions.
82.
IRMGARD MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 72–85 (2d ed. 2017).
83.
The main differences between the two principles concern the date of valuation and
the range of consequential losses that the investor is entitled to recover. For detailed discussion of the application of these principles in the context of expropriation disputes, see Ratner,
supra note 11. For a more comprehensive examination of the application of these principles in
relation to expropriation disputes and other treaty breaches, see MARBOE, supra note 82.
84.
See, e.g., Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, ¶ 843 (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
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equivalence of the two sets of principles is more important than the nuances.
Regardless of which set of principles is applied, compensation for breach of
an investment treaty is effectively equivalent to the investor’s loss relative
to a counter-factual future scenario in which the host state does not breach
the treaty. This standard is analogous to “expectation damages” in contract
85
law.

B. How Our Proposal Differs from the Status Quo
1. Our Proposal
Our proposal calls for a conceptual reorientation of the principles governing liability and compensation under investment treaties. In contrast to
the set of absolute protections commonly found in investment treaties, our
approach is deliberately parsimonious. We propose and justify the simplest
possible combination of liability rules and compensation standards that can
achieve what we take to be the treaties’ objective: ensuring both state parties
are better off from becoming and remaining party to an investment treaty.
Our proposal is that:
i.

A state should only face the possibility of having to compensate a foreign investor if the host state breaches or
modifies the domestic legal regime governing the investment, and

ii.

Compensation should be the lesser of the investor’s loss
and the host state’s gain from the host state not having had
the new domestic legal regime in place when the investment was made. (If one of these values is zero, no compensation is required.)

As such, our proposal requires a tribunal to answer three successive questions. This section explores each of these questions in more detail. In doing
so, we clarify how our proposal differs from the status quo. We also show
that our proposal is practically feasible, in that it relies on sources of evidence and types of expertise that tribunals either possess themselves or are
likely to have access to.
The first question is whether the host state has breached or modified the
domestic legal regime that governed the investment at the time the investment was made. Such a breach or modification is a necessary, but not suffi-

documents/italaw7194.pdf (“the Tribunal considers that in this particular case this discussion
is rather theoretical and devoid of significant practical effects”); Siag v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, ¶ 542 (June 1, 2009), 21 World Trade & Arb.
Materials 1171 (2009).
85.
See Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON.
466 (1980).
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cient, condition for the state’s liability. The focus on the domestic legal regime reflects the fact that our proposal is designed to provide states with a
way to make domestic legal commitments credible, thereby solving the
86
problem of time inconsistency of state conduct. Although existing jurisprudence is not entirely consistent, this focus on stabilizing the domestic legal regime is consistent with well-established threads of jurisprudence. For
example, the tribunal in GAMI v. Mexico explained that:
International law does not appraise the content of a regulatory programme extant before an investor decides to commit. The inquiry is
whether the state abided by or implemented that programme. It is in
this sense that a government’s failure to implement or abide by its
own law in a manner adversely affecting a foreign investor may but
87
will not necessarily lead to a violation of [the investment treaty].
Our conception of the “domestic legal regime” includes the combination of
rights and obligations created by any contract negotiated between the investor and the host state, as well as the powers of the host state to regulate the
investment under laws in force at the time the investment is made. The domestic legal regime governing the investment defines questions such as
permissible uses of land and other assets, mandatory regulatory requirements, and tax, royalty, and pricing arrangements. The domestic legal regime also defines the state’s power to take action related to the investment
in specified circumstances—for example, environmental laws in force when
the investment is made might give the state’s environmental agency the
power to shut the investment down for serious and persistent noncompliance with limits on pollution. This understanding of the domestic legal regime is consistent with the position of the U.S. government, which, in
submissions to investor-state arbitral tribunals, has consistently argued that
“in an instance where property rights are subject to legal limitations existing
at the time the property rights are acquired, any subsequent burdening of
property rights by such limitations does not constitute an impairment of the
88
original property interest.”
Our conception of the domestic legal regime does not, however, include
expectations that foreign investors have, or may claim to have, that are not
grounded in law. In this respect our proposal is narrower than existing juris-

86.
See, e.g., Markusen, supra note 20; Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties
That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L
L. 639, 659 (1998).
87.
Gami Invs. Inc. v. United Mexican States, Award, 44 I.L.M. 545, ¶ 91
(UNCITRAL, 2005).
88.
Lone Pine Res. Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2, Submission of
the United States of America, 5 n.15 (Aug. 16, 2017), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid
/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C4406/DC10978_En.pdf.
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prudence as it relates to the protection of investors’ “legitimate expecta89
tions.”
The question of whether a state has changed or breached the domestic
legal regime is a question of law, and therefore the type of question that ar90
bitrators should be capable of answering. Under existing jurisprudence,
tribunals routinely decide whether a host state has changed or breached its
domestic legal regime as one step in the more complex application of existing investment treaty provisions. For example, in the Argentinian gas cases,
several tribunals observed that Argentina’s unilateral modification of tariff
91
rates changed the legal regime governing those investments; in Bilcon v.
Canada, the tribunal determined that the way the environmental assessment
92
of the investor’s proposal was conducted breached Canadian law. Tribunals also apply domestic law in a range of other contexts under existing in93
vestment treaty jurisprudence. Under our proposal, if the answer to this
question is “yes,” then the host state may be liable for a breach of the investment treaty, subject to the answers to the second and third question. If
the answer to this question is “no,” no further questions arise.
If the first question is answered affirmatively, the inquiry then moves to
the second—and, potentially, the third—question. Both the second and third
questions relate to the quantum of relevant loses and gains incurred by the
disputing parties. This reveals a significant difference between the structure
of our proposal and existing jurisprudence. Under existing jurisprudence,
89.
In the past, tribunals have found that investors had legitimate expectations that were
derived from the generally supportive attitude of the authorities of the host state toward the
investment, or from the investor’s own business plans. See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v.
Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 163 (May 25, 2004), 44 I.L.M 91 (2005); Walter
Bau Ag. v. Thailand, Award, 22 World Trade & Arb. Materials 681, ¶¶ 12.2–12.3
(UNCITRAL, 2010). Under our proposal, such claims would inevitably fail.
90.
Under normal principles of private international law, courts and tribunals are often
called on to apply the law of a jurisdiction with which they may not be familiar. This is a
normal and entirely unremarkable aspect of adjudication of disputes with international dimensions. Nevertheless, some commentators have argued that the quality of investment tribunals’
engagement with domestic law under existing jurisprudence is patchy. See, e.g., JARROD
HEPBURN, DOMESTIC LAW IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 192 (2017). That
said, there are also many examples of good practice, and commentators have also provided
constructive advice on how questions of domestic law might be resolved as a practical matter—for example, through reliance on appropriate domestic materials and expert witnesses. Id.
at 182–92.
91.
See, e.g., LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1,
Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 130–134 (Oct. 3, 2006), 46 I.L.M 36 (2006).
92.
Bilcon of Del., Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., Permanent Ct. of Arb. [PCA] Case No. 200904, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 600–602 (2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/case-documents/italaw4212.pdf.
93.
For example, tribunals inevitably apply domestic law in determining the existence
and extent of the investor’s property rights that constitute the investment, as international law
contains no rules on property rights. See HEPBURN, supra note 90, at 106; Zachary Douglas,
The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 151, 204
(2003).

Winter 2021]

Against Balancing

257

the practical outcome of a dispute normally turns on whether the substantive
protections of the investment treaty have been breached. In contrast, most of
the analytical work in our proposal is done by the principles governing the
quantum. The possibility of an investor obtaining compensation for minor
breaches or changes to the domestic legal regime will ordinarily be excluded at this stage.
The second question is the extent of loss suffered by the foreign investor as a result of the state not having had the new domestic legal regime in
94
place at the time that the investment was made. This question involves
valuation on a counter-factual basis, but the counter-factual is different from
that currently used to calculate compensation for breach of investment treaties. For example, if a state imposes new restrictions on a coal-fired power
station’s water usage, our proposal requires the tribunal to determine what
would have occurred if the restrictions were already in place prior to the investment being made. The evidence required to construct this past counterfactual can be found in the historical record, particularly as it relates to the
investor’s investment decision and actually incurred expenses. In contrast,
the principles that currently govern compensation under investment treaties
require a tribunal to determine the future scenario that would have existed if
95
the restrictions had not been introduced. Constructing a future counterfactual of this sort requires a complex set of interlocking forecasts about the
situation the investor would have been in but for the host state’s breach of
the investment treaty. For this reason, answering the second question posed
by our proposal will normally be simpler than the valuation exercise required to calculate compensation under existing jurisprudence.
In many situations that are controversial under existing jurisprudence,
the outcome under our proposal is straightforward. Consider, for example,
situations in which an investor would have proceeded with the investment
even if the new domestic legal regime had been in place when the investment was made. Regulatory changes that reduce profitability of an invest96
ment without undermining its financial viability fall into this category. In
these cases, there is no relevant loss to the investor, as the investor is not left
worse off than if it had decided not to invest in the first place. No compensation is due under our proposal.
94.
In situations where the state has breached the pre-existing domestic legal regime,
the “new” domestic legal regime refers to a domestic legal regime that authorizes the conduct
in question. In situations where the state has changed the pre-existing domestic legal regime,
the “new” domestic legal regime refers, obviously, to the domestic legal regime after the
change.
95.
These precise circumstances were at issue in Vattenfall v. Germany I, but it is important to note that the Vattenfall I arbitration settled prior to any determination of the merits
of the investor’s claim. As such, it is unclear whether the tribunal would have found a breach
of the Energy Charter Treaty, requiring compensation. Vattenfall AB, v. Republic of Ger. (I),
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6, Award Embodying the Parties’ Settlement Agreement (Mar. 11,
2011), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0890.pdf.
96.
See discussion infra Section IV.C.2.ii.
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In other circumstances, the foreign investor would not have proceeded
with the investment if the new domestic legal regime had been in place from
the outset. This will normally be the case where a host state’s breach or
change to its domestic legal regime leads to the termination of an investment. It will also be the case in some situations in which the investment
continues to operate, insofar as breach or change to the domestic legal regime makes it impossible for the investor to recover the capital it initially
invested. In both situations, our second question is equivalent to the stand97
ard of “reliance damages” in contract law —i.e. compensation is the
amount the investor has lost by investing in reliance on the domestic legal
regime in place at the time that the investment was made. This loss is equal
to the amount originally invested by the investor adjusted to include the cost
of capital, minus revenue income earned from the operation of the investment. Interest would be calculated on the basis of the investor’s cost of capital. This standard for calculating compensation is within arbitrators’ experience. Several investment treaty tribunals have calculated compensation on
98
the basis of an investor’s sunk costs, in circumstances where there was insufficient evidence to support the complex set of interlocking forecasts nec99
essary to award compensation on a “but for” basis.
The third question concerns the amount that the host state has gained
from not having had the new domestic legal regime in place at the time that
the investment was made. This is equivalent to one the methods for deter100
mining the “restitution interest” in contract law. Under this conception of

97.
See Shavell, supra note 85, at 471.
98.
See Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶¶ 8.3.3–8.3.13 (Aug. 20, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/ita0215.pdf;); Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID
Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶¶ 590, 633 (Nov. 30, 2017), 30 World Trade & Arb. Materials
5 (2018).
99.
See SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN WILLIAMS, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 206–07 (2008) (citing Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001); Wena Hotels Ltd. v.
Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, ¶¶ 124–125 (Dec. 8, 2000), 41
I.L.M. 933 (2002); Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004); S. Pac. Props.
Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Award (May 20, 1992), 32
I.L.M. 1470 (1993)); see also Louis Wells, Double Dipping in Arbitration Awards? An Economist Questions Damages Awarded to Khara Bodas Company in Indonesia 19 ARB. INT’L
471, 475 (2003).
100.
According to the restatements, one measure “of money . . . awarded to protect a
party’s restitution interest,” is “the extent to which the other party’s property has been increased in value or his other interests advanced.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. §
371(b) (Am. Law Inst. 1981). For an example, see Bush v. Canfield 2 Conn. 485 (Conn.
1818). In contract law, calculation of compensation on a restitutionary basis is normally used
when expectation damages are judged to be insufficient. This differs from our proposal, which
will almost inevitably lead to lower awards of compensation than would be the case under the
principle of full reparation.
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restitution “the defaulting party returns only the payments made to him.”
This is the most innovative aspect of our proposal, as compensation is rarely
102
awarded on a restitution basis in international law.
The third question only arises if the first two questions have been answered affirmatively—i.e. if the host state has breached or changed the domestic legal regime, and the investor has suffered a loss due to the state not
having had the new domestic legal regime in place when the investment was
made. The answer to this third question is based on comparison to the same
counter-factual used to answer the second question, which considerably
simplifies the inquiry. The difference is that the third question concerns the
host state’s gain, rather than the investor’s loss, relative to this counterfactual. As with the second question, the evidence required to answer the
third question can be found in the historical record. Relevant evidence will
include documentation of amounts actually paid to the state in order to obtain permits and concessions, as well as valuation of any assets or resources
103
transferred into state ownership during the lifespan of the investment.
Once the value of the relevant gain to the host state is determined, interest
would be calculated on the basis of the host’s cost of capital and applied
from the date at which the gain was obtained until the date the award is
paid, to reflect the time value of money.
The inquiry necessary to answer the third question illustrates the underlying logic of our rule—namely, protecting investors from legal change only
insofar as is necessary to solve problems of time inconsistency for the host
state. Consider, for example, the case of Bilcon v. Canada. The case concerned an investor’s proposal to build and operate a gravel quarry in the
province of Nova Scotia. The investor claimed that it was originally encouraged to proceed with project by the provincial authorities and spent several
104
million dollars developing its proposal. However, many members of the
101.
Shavell, supra note 85, at 471.
102.
Confusingly, the term “restitution” is also used in international law as shorthand for
an order of restitution of property—e.g., transfer of property back to a claimant following an
illegal expropriation. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, art. 34 (Oct. 24, 2001); see, e.g., Factory at
Chorzów (Ger. V. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 17, at 43 (Sept. 13). An order for restitution
of property should be clearly distinguished from calculation of compensation on the basis of
restitution, as the term is used in contract law. The latter is focused on determining the amount
that the defaulting party has gained, independently of the question of how much the innocent
party has lost.
103.
In our companion paper, the superior efficiency and equity properties of our rule
were proven, assuming that gain was net of losses and that both losses and gains were broadly
defined to include everything from tax revenue to social and environmental costs and benefits.
See, e.g., Aisbett & Bonnitcha, supra note 12, at 22 (analyzing Case 3c). Later in this paper,
we provide examples of how these principles could be operationalized in investment disputes
as a practical matter. See infra Section IV.C.2.ii.
104.
Bilcon of Del., Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., Permanent Ct. of Arb. [PCA] Case No. 200904, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 455–471 (2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/case-documents/italaw4212.pdf.
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local community opposed the project and, partly for this reason, the Canadian environmental review process refused to grant the permission necessary
105
for the project to go ahead.
The tribunal held that this decision was made in breach of Canadian environmental law, meaning that Canada’s action is potentially compensable
under our proposal. As to the second question, if Canadian environmental
law had clearly precluded the project from going ahead prior to the time at
which Bilcon began its development activities, it seems clear that the investor would not have spent its money pursuing the project. As such, the investor suffered a potentially compensable loss under our proposal. However,
turning to the third question, there is no evidence that Canada gained anything from Bilcon’s pre-development activities, so no compensation is due.
This is a situation where the investor has suffered a loss due to the changing
political priorities of the host state, not a case of opportunistic action where
a state has encouraged an investment and then “changed the rules” so as to
acquire the value of the investment. (The outcome under our proposal would
be different if Canada had sold Bilcon the right to build a quarry on a particular location, and subsequently refused to grant permission for the development to proceed.)

2. Some Further Case Examples
In this section we explore the practical implications of our proposal, using a series of well-known investment treaty disputes as examples. Following our companion paper, we divide our discussion between cases in which
state conduct completely destroys an investment, and cases in which state
conduct leads to a partial reduction in the value of an investment that continues to operate.

i. Cases Involving Expropriation and/or Permanent Shut-Down of an
Investment
Under our proposal, compensation will not necessarily be required for
state conduct that shuts-down or entirely eviscerates an investment. This is
one important difference between our proposal and existing investment treaties. Consider the case of Metalclad v. Mexico. Metalclad had purchased a
site in Mexico on which to build a hazardous waste landfill. It obtained the
permits to operate the landfill from both state and federal agencies and had
been told by federal officials that it did not need any additional authorizations. When construction was well underway, the municipality issued a stop
work order, claiming that a municipal construction permit was also required.
The municipality ultimately refused to grant the permit and, despite having
been completed in the interim, the landfill could not begin operation. The

105.

Id. ¶¶ 502–506.
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municipality’s action appears to have been in breach of Mexican law. But,
for the tribunal, the two decisive factors were that Metalclad had been led to
believe that it was not required to obtain a construction permit, and that municipality’s stop work order had then completely destroyed the value of its
107
investment.
Under our proposal the threshold question is whether the municipality’s
conduct was consistent with Mexican law. It appears that it was not. The
second question is whether Metalclad suffered any loss compared to the situation that would have existed if the Mexican legal system had prohibited
the investment from the outset. Clearly, Metalclad did suffer such a loss—
specifically, the expense of constructing the facility that it unable to recover.
This was the basis on which compensation was actually awarded in that
108
case. Nevertheless, Metalclad’s claim fails to satisfy the third test imposed
by our proposal, as Mexico did not obtain any benefit from not having prohibited the investment from the outset. In proceeding with the investment,
Metalclad did not make any payment to Mexican government entities or
contribute to the provision of any public infrastructure subsequently repurposed by Mexico. Mexico did not acquire ownership of any of Metalclad’s
assets, such as the landfill site, the ownership of which was retained by
109
110
Metalclad. As such, no compensation would be due under our proposal.
Lawyers for investor-claimants might be tempted to argue that an investor’s expenditure within the territory of a host state constitutes a “gain” to
that state by virtue of its effect in stimulating the local economy. The argument, in this case, would be that Mexican economy benefited from the money Metalclad spent constructing the facility. However, such expenditure diverts productive resources, including labor, from other economic activities.
In order to make a case, on the facts, that Metalclad’s expenditure in itself
constituted a gain for the host state, the investor would need to show that the
employment generated was additive, for example by showing that the employees were paid more than their alternative wage or income, or that the

106.
See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1,
Award, ¶ 86 (Aug. 30, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001).
107.
Id. ¶¶ 81–86, 103.
108.
Id. ¶ 122.
109.
Id. ¶ 127
110.
This example illustrates one important difference between our proposal and an earlier proposal made by Newcombe, supra note 46. Newcombe has argued that regulatory expropriation jurisprudence under investment treaties should be organized around the concept of
appropriation. Although his terminology appears similar to ours, he would treat the cancellation of a license or permit as a “quasi-appropriation” requiring compensation because “the
state is essentially reacquiring rights that it can use or grant to another party in the future.”
Newcombe, supra note 46, at 19, 22. Unlike our proposal, his analysis does not depend on
whether the investor had to pay the state to acquire the license or permit in question. The difference between our approaches stems from the fact that our argument is grounded in an economic analysis of the problem of time inconsistency, whereas his argument is animated by
concerns of fairness to the investor. Newcombe, supra note 46, at 55.
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income tax collected was higher than if the project not taken place. The
compensation due would then be the difference between the actual wages
and taxes paid and the economic situation that would have existed in the absence of the investor’s expenditure. As a conceptual point, any such “gain”
to the host state will necessarily be less than the amount actually expended
by the investor. As a practical point, investors bear the evidentiary burden of
111
substantiating their claims in investment treaty arbitration, so such arguments would only be likely to succeed in situations where an investor can
adduce specific and concrete evidence its wasted expenditure in pursuing an
investment created benefits for the host state’s economy.
Insofar as compensation is required for the shut-down of an investment
under our proposal, the amount of compensation required will invariably be
lower than is the case under currently existing investment treaties. Al
Kharifi v. Libya provides a simple illustration. The dispute in this case concerned a 2006 agreement between a foreign investor and Libya for the investor to build and operate a new hotel. From the description of the facts in
the award, it seems that the investor had spent $5 million U.S. dollars
(“USD”) over four years pursuing the project before it was cancelled by
112
Libya in 2010. This included an initial payment of $130,000 U.S. dollars
113
(“USD”) to the Libyan Treasury. Even though construction of the project
never commenced, the arbitral tribunal awarded $900 million USD to the
investor on the basis that, if Libya had not cancelled the project, the investment would have been highly profitable for the investor for the eighty-two
114
year period of the investment’s proposed duration. (In June 2020, the
award was annulled by Egyptian courts, due to the disproportionate amount
115
of compensation awarded.) Under our proposal, compensation would also
be due as a result of Libya’s breach of the underlying project agreement.
But the amount of compensation would be the lesser of the investor’s predevelopment expenditures and the investor’s payment to Libya—i.e.
$130,000 USD. Interest and would run from the date the investor made the
payment to the Libyan Treasury until the award was paid, with the interest
rate set at Libya’s cost of capital.

111.
For discussion of a party’s evidentiary burden to prove the facts on which its claim
rests, see FRÉDÉRIC GILLES SOURGENS, KABIR DUGGAL & IAN A. LAIRD, EVIDENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 26–28 (2018).
112.
See Al-Kharafi & Sons Co. v. Libya, Award, 367–68 (Cairo Reg’l Ctr. For Int’l
Com. Arb, 2013), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1554.pdf.
113.
Id. at 18.
114.
Id. at 382. An additional complication in this case is that it was argued on the basis
that the Libya had breached both the relevant investment treaty (the Unified Agreement for
the Investment of Arab Capital) and the underlying investment contract with the investor. For
this reason, the tribunal argued that it had “discretion” in determining the amount of compensation, and then relied on principles of Libyan law to justify its approach. See id. at 364–65.
115.
Mah. Kamat al-Isti’n f [Court of Appeal], Cairo, Judgment No. 39, session of 3
June 2020, year 130 (Egypt).
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One important feature of our rule is that it does not require tribunals to
assess the strength or validity of public policy justifications for the host
state’s conduct. Consider the case of Crystallex v. Venezuela. In that case,
the foreign investor had made a series of payments to the Venezuelan government and to a Venezuelan state-owned enterprise to acquire mining
rights for the Las Christinas site. Venezuelan authorities subsequently rejected the investor’s application to develop the site citing “concerns for the
116
environment and the indigenous people of the Imataca Forest Reserve.”
The arbitral tribunal found that Venezuela’s action breached the investment
treaty. Even though the mine was never built, the tribunal awarded the investor $1.2 billion USD in compensation, reflecting the tribunal’s estimate
of the likely value of the mine if it had been allowed to go ahead.
Our proposal would also require compensation in this situation due to
117
Venezuela’s apparent breach of its own legal regime, regardless of the validity of the environmental and indigenous concerns that Venezuela cited to
justify the measure. However, the amount of compensation due would be
the lesser of Crystallex’s loss from having made the investment and Venezuela’s gains arising from Crystallex’s investment (including gains to Venezuelan state-owned entities). The tribunal did not quantify either amount, as
neither is decisive under existing jurisprudence.
The tribunal did, however, indicate that Crystallex’s investment relatedexpenses fell in the range between $200 million USD (Venezuela’s esti118
mate) and $645 million USD (Crystallex’s estimate). The tribunal also
identified all the elements necessary to value the benefit of Crystallex’s investment activity to Venezuela. These were the $15 million USD that
Crystallex paid to the Venezuela state-owned enterprise to acquire the Las
119
Christinas mining rights, the unspecified amounts Crystallex paid to Ven120
ezuela as a bond and in environmental taxes, and the value to Venezuela
of public infrastructure, including a medical center that Crystallex con121
structed under the project agreement. From this description of the facts,
the benefit of Crystallex’s investment activity to Venezuela was almost certainly less than Crystallex’s losses arising from its investment related-

116.
Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)
/11/2, Award, ¶ 44 (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw7194.pdf.
117.
In order to decide whether Venezuela had breached the investment treaty, the
Crystallex tribunal engaged in an elaborate analysis of the investor’s expectations. It did not
directly answer the simpler question of whether Venezuela’s rejection of the investor’s application breached its own legal regime. But, insofar as the tribunal touched on the question, it
appears that there Venezuela did breach its own legal regime governing the evaluation and
approval of mining permit applications. See, e.g., id. ¶ 614.
118.
Id. ¶¶ 912–913.
119.
Id. ¶ 18.
120.
Id. ¶ 245.
121.
Id. ¶ 194.
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expenses, meaning that compensation under our proposal would be the former. Either way, on these facts, our proposal leads to compensation vastly
lower than that currently required under investment treaties.

ii. Cases Involving Interference with Investments that Continue to
Operate
One attractive feature of our proposal is that it provides a simple way to
resolve complex—and often highly controversial—regulatory disputes relating to foreign investment. Consider the example of Philip Morris v. Australia. As is well known, the dispute concerned a change to Australia’s domestic legal regime: the introduction of a law mandating plain packaging
for tobacco products. Philip Morris’s central argument was that this regulatory change was arbitrary and unjustified, in the sense that it was unlikely to
122
reduce tobacco consumption. The case was dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds, so the tribunal never decided whether Australia’s conduct would
123
have breached the investment treaty.
Under our proposal, the threshold question is whether there was a
change in Australia’s legal regime after Philip Morris invested in Australia.
The answer is clearly yes (leaving aside complications arising from the restructuring of Philip Morris business that ultimately led to the claim being
124
dismissed). The second question is whether Philip Morris suffered a loss
compared to the situation that would have existed if Australia had had tobacco plain packaging rules in force prior to the time at which Philip Morris
first established its Australian operations. The answer to this question is
clearly “no.” The sale of tobacco products in Australia remained a highly
profitable business, even after the introduction of the new law mandating
125
plain packaging. This demonstrates that Philip Morris would have invested anyway, even if the new laws had been in place from the outset and,
therefore, that there was no relevant loss to the investor. Under our proposal, no compensation is due, independently of an inquiry into the strength
of the public health justification offered by Australia for its legal change.
Nevertheless, there will be circumstances where our proposal requires
compensation for interferences with investments that continue to operate.
The series of disputes arising from changes to the regulatory regime govern-

122.
See, e.g., Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. The Commonwealth of Austl., PCA Case No.
2012-12, Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 7.7 (2011), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0665.pdf.
123.
Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. The Commonwealth of Austl., PCA Case No. 2012-12,
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 588 (2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/italaw7303_0.pdf.
124.
For a summary, see id. ¶¶ 141–164.
125.
See Michelle Scollo & Megan Bayly, The Manufacturing And Wholesaling Industry
In Australia—Major International Companies, in TOBACCO IN AUSTRALIA: FACTS AND
ISSUES (M.M. Scollo & M.H. Winstanley eds., 2019), https://www.tobaccoinaustralia.org.au
/chapter-10-tobacco-industry/10-3-the-manufacturing-and-wholesaling-industry-in-australia.
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ing investments in solar power generation in Spain provide one example of
a situation where compensation might be required under our rule. In the
2000s, Spain established a regulatory regime with the aim of encouraging
investment in renewable energy. Generators of renewable energy were given the choice between a fixed tariff or a premium over and above market
126
tariff paid to other electricity providers. These tariffs were to be reviewed
every four years, subject to the proviso that “a reasonable rate of profitability shall always be guaranteed with reference to the cost of money in the
127
capital markets.” The regime was more successful than anticipated in attracting new investment in renewable energy. However, following the 2008
financial crisis, demand for electricity in Spain fell sharply. As a result of
these two factors, the “tariff deficit”—the gap between the amount the
Spanish state was paying to purchase renewable electricity and the revenue
that it could cover from the on-sale of that electricity for consumption—
128
increased to over €20 billion Euros. In response to domestic political pressure for reform, as well as pressure from the International Monetary Fund
129
and the European Commission, Spain dismantled the existing regulatory
regime in a series of steps. In the final step, from 2013, existing renewable
energy generators were paid only the market price for electricity, plus an
additional Special Payment (subsidy) benchmarked according to the costs of
building and operating an efficient renewable energy plant and intended to
ensure that such a plant would still be able to achieve a return of 7.398 per130
cent per annum over its life cycle.
These regulatory changes have led to over forty ISDS claims against
131
Spain. Many of these cases remain pending. Of those that have been resolved, investors have won eleven, while Spain has successfully defended
132
three. Some of these differences in outcome can, arguably, be justified by
133
differences in the factual specifics in the underlying cases. Others are ex-

126.
RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13
/30, Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, ¶ 109 (Nov. 30, 2018),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw10455_0.pdf.
127.
Id. ¶ 114.
128.
Id. ¶ 116.
129.
Tobias Buck, Spanish Energy Reforms Slash Subsidies to Suppliers, FIN. TIMES
(July 13, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/a7e539a8-eb0c-11e2-bfdb-00144feabdc0.
130.
RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Ltd v. Kingdom of Spain., ICSID Case No. ARB/13
/30, Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, ¶¶ 132–141.
131.
See Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator: Spain Cases as Respondent State,
U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-disputesettlement/country/197/spain/investor (last visited Nov. 8, 2020).
132.
Id.
133.
Yulia S Selivanova, Changes in Renewables Support Policy and Investment Protection Under the Energy Charter Treaty: Analysis of Jurisprudence and Outlook for the Current
Arbitration Cases, 33 ICSID REV. 433, 451 (2018) (comparing Isolux Neth. BV v. Kingdom
of Spain, SCC Case V2013/153, Final Award (2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/italaw9219.pdf, with Eiser Infrastructure Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain,
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amples of divergent outcomes on substantially identical facts. The differences between the outcomes in the cases that have been decided to date turn
largely on tribunals’ assessment of the “legitimate expectations” of the investor in question and on the tribunals’ views about whether the regulatory
135
changes were “reasonable.” In those cases where investors have succeeded, tribunals have had to evaluate complex financial evidence to determine
the amount of compensation due under existing jurisprudence.
Our proposal provides a better way to resolve such cases. The first
question is whether Spain changed the domestic legal regime governing existing solar investments. The answer is clearly “yes.” The second question
concerns the loss that the investor in question suffered compared to the situation that would have existed if the new subsidy regime had been in place
from the time at which it made its investment. This loss is equal to the
amount originally invested by the investor adjusted to include the cost of
capital over the operating life cycle of the project, minus the operating income that the investment generated both before and after the new regime
was introduced.
Although most of the Spanish solar tribunals to date have—consistently
with existing jurisprudence—calculated compensation according to the
136
principle of “full reparation,” the tribunal in RREEF v. Spain held that
compensation should be calculated in order to ensure that the investor ob-

ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, Final Award (May 4, 2017), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid
/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3286/DS14433_En.pdf).
134.
Lisa Bohmer, Analysis: Majority in Stadtwerke Munchen v. Spain Considers That
Investors in Spanish CSP Plants Could Not Legitimately Expect Legislative Stability; Kaj
Hober Disagrees, INV. ARB. REP. (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.iareporter.com/articles
/analysis-majority-in-stadtwerke-munchen-v-spain-considers-that-investors-in-spanish-cspplants-could-not-legitimately-expect-legislative-stability-kaj-hober-disagrees/
(comparing
Stadtwerke München GmbH v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/1, Award (Dec. 2, 2019),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw11056.pdf, with OperaFund
Eco-Invest SICAV PLC v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/36, Award (Sept. 6, 2019), http:
//icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C4806/DS12832_En.pdf, NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/11, Final Award (May
31, 2019), 31 World Trade & Arb. Materials 987 (2019), and Foresight Lux. Solar 1 S.à.r.l. v.
Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/150, Final Award (2018), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/italaw10142.pdf).
135.
See, e.g., 9REN Holding S.à.r.l. v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/15, Award, ¶¶
212–216 (May 31, 2019), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw10565.pdf; Isabella Reynoso, Spain’s Renewable Energy Saga: Lessons for International Law and Sustainable Development, INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (June 27, 2019),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/en/2019/06/27/spains-renewable-energy-saga-lessons-forinternational-investment-law-and-sustainable-development-isabella-reynoso/.
136.
Novenergia II—Energy and Env’t (SCA) (Grand Duchy of Lux.), SICAR v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/063, Final Arbitral Award, 30 World Trade & Arb. Materials 947, ¶¶ 803–847 (2018).
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137

tained a reasonable rate of return. To perform these calculations, the
RREEF tribunal assessed the investor’s initial expenditure, determined the
cost of capital, added an additional increment to allow the investor some excess profit to arrive at a reasonable rate of return, and then determined the
extent to which the new regulatory regime failed to ensure this rate of return
138
on an ongoing basis. The RREEF tribunal’s analysis illustrates that the inquiry required by our second question is feasible, as a practical matter.
However, one difference between our approach and that adopted by the tribunal in RREEF is that our approach would take the very generous returns
that investors earned prior to the change in the regulatory regime into ac139
count. Another is that our approach relies on the cost of capital only;
compensation should not include any allowance for excess profitability over
and above the cost of capital.
The third question under our approach concerns Spain’s gain from not
having had the new regime in place. This question draws attention to an important conceptual challenge facing existing jurisprudence. In the case of
RREEF v. Spain, for example, the investor-claimant was not the company
that had originally constructed the solar plants. Rather, the claimant in the
case was an asset-manager that had purchased a stake in solar plants several
years after construction, having been attracted by the above-market returns
140
available in that sector under the original regulatory regime. In RREEF,
this factual quirk led to the bizarre outcome that the claimant (the assetmanager) likely obtained more in compensation than the original investor
would have obtained in the same case, on account of the fact that the assetmanager paid more to buy the investment than the investment had initially
cost to build. There is no plausible policy justification for such an outcome.
The third question in our proposal deals with this problem in a straightforward way, by focusing on the gain that the host state has obtained from
not having had the new regulatory regime in place when the initial invest141
ment was made. Conceptually, there is a gain to the state if it induced the

137.
See RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB
/13/30, Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, ¶ 515 (Nov. 30, 2018),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw10455_0.pdf.
138.
Id. ¶¶ 567–591 (detailing this methodology). Some of the final calculations carry
over to RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30,
Award, ¶ 19 (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw10455_0.pdf.
139.
This follows from the fact that our inquiry seeks to measure the loss the investor
has suffered compared to the situation that would have existed if the new, less generous, regime had been in place from the time at which the investment was made. Cf. RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, ¶ 590 (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.italaw.com
/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw10455_0.pdf.
140.
Id. ¶¶ 142–177.
141.
If the new regulatory regime had been in place when the asset-manager was contemplating buying the solar plants from the original, there is no doubt that the sale would not
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investment by offering a generous regulatory regime before switching to a
less generous regime after the initial investor had incurred the significant
sunk costs involved in building the solar plants. As a practical matter, the
value of that gain to the state is the value of the renewable energy obtained
from the investment, less the amount actually paid for that electricity, with
both figures calculated over the operating life cycle of the investment. The
value of the renewable electricity is the amount it would have cost an efficient operator to produce that electricity using the technology in question at
the time the investment was made. These calculations could be performed
using information that is readily available to arbitral tribunals—specifically,
cost data from other operators in the solar industry. Indeed, it seems that
Spain actually led evidence in several of the arbitrations relating to the cost
structure of efficient solar plants, as this benchmark was one of the princi142
ples underpinning both the original and the new regulatory regimes.
While investor-claimants took the view that these figures underestimated
143
the costs facing real plants, this is a debate that could have been resolved
through further evidence. In several of the Spanish solar cases it is likely
that gain to the host state calculated in this way would be zero, meaning that
no compensation would be due.

C. Our Proposal Resolves Practical Challenges with Existing
Jurisprudence
In Part IV.A, we showed that balancing, as a mode of reasoning, is central to existing arbitral jurisprudence. This mode of reasoning requires tribunals to evaluate the policy justifications for state conduct. While there are
differences between balancing techniques, particularly as they relate to the
144
level of deference shown to the host state’s own decision-making process,
existing tribunals are regularly drawn into controversial inquiries about
states’ motives, and the purpose and effectiveness of measures that are subject to challenge.
have gone ahead. However, Spain gained nothing from that transaction. Therefore, treating
this transaction as an “investment” would mean that no compensation is due. See id. ¶ 163.
142.
Id. ¶ 542; Isolux Neth., BV v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case V2013/153, Final
Award ¶ 134 (July 17, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw9219.pdf.
143.
Selivanova, supra note 133, at 449.
144.
For discussion of the appropriate level of deference in investment treaty arbitration,
see generally William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public
Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. (2010);
Stephan W. Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the
Standard of Review Through Comparative Public Law (Soc’y Int’l Econ. L. 3rd Biennial
Glob. Conf. Working Paper No. 2012/33, 2012); Anna T. Katselas, Do Investment Treaties
Prescribe a Deferential Standard of Review, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 87 (2012); Caroline
Henckels, Balancing Investment Protection and the Public Interest: The Role of the Standard
of Review and the Importance of Deference in Investor-State Arbitration 4 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 197 (2013).
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In contrast, our proposal does not require tribunals to resolve any of the
questions that ordinarily arise within a balancing mode of reasoning. Under
our proposal, inquiry into that state’s motive is not relevant, meaning that a
tribunal is not required to unpick the decision-making process leading to the
change in the domestic legal regime. This means that a tribunal is not required to determine whether the state is genuinely motivated by environmental considerations in cases like Metalclad and Tecmed, discussed previ145
ously. The objective of the state’s measure is not relevant, meaning that
the tribunal is not required to take a view on which government purposes
146
are legitimate. This means, for example, that tribunals do not need to resolve debates within existing jurisprudence about if and, if so, when a state
is entitled to change its domestic legal regime to reduce very high rates of
profitability being obtained by operators in regulated industries or natural
147
monopolies.
The effectiveness of the state’s measure is also not relevant under our
proposal, meaning that the tribunal is not required to reassess the evidentiary basis for the state’s conduct, or to come to a view about the reasonableness of the state’s own assessment of the evidentiary basis. This would
avoid the need for tribunals to resolve issues such as the disagreement between the majority and minority arbitrators in Philip Morris v. Uruguay
about whether Uruguay’s restrictions on marketing of brand variants of to148
bacco products had a sufficient evidentiary basis. Finally, the balance a
state has struck between competing interests is not relevant, meaning that
the tribunal is not required to ascribe weights to competing policy objectives, or to review the weighting of objectives implicit in state action. This
would resolve the challenges faced by the tribunals in the Spanish solar cases, discussed above, in determining how far Spain could legitimately alter

145.
See supra Section IV.b.2.i for discussion of Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed
S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 43
I.L.M. 133 (2004).
146.
For the argument that existing jurisprudence requires tribunals to take a view, explicitly or implicitly, on which purposes are legitimate, see Allen S. Weiner, Indirect Expropriations: The Need for a Taxonomy of “Legitimate” Regulatory Purposes, 5 INT’L L.F. 166
(2003).
147.
For the view that host states are generally entitled to take action to reduce “excess
profits,” see AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22,
Award, ¶ 10.3.9 (Sep. 23, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS
/OnlineAwards/C114/DC1730_En.pdf. For the view that the provision of above market rates
of return are “bait” to attract foreign investment that a state cannot then renounce, see Novenergia II—Energy and Env’t (SCA) (Grand Duchy of Lux.), SICAR v. Kingdom of Spain,
Arb. Inst. Of the Stockholm Chamber of Com. [SCC] Case No. 2015/063, Final Arbitral
Award, 30 World Trade & Arb. Materials 947, ¶ 694 (2018). For discussion of these issues in
other contexts, see Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 29.
148.
Compare Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switz.) v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 305 (Jul. 8, 2016), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid
/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C1000/DC9012_En.pdf, with id. ¶ 150 (Arb. Born, dissenting).
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the 2007 regulatory regime governing investment in solar power generation
149
without incurring liability under investment treaties.
By removing the need for tribunals to evaluate the justifications for
state conduct, our proposal resolves several challenges with existing jurisprudence. First, there is the question of institutional competence. Almost all
arbitrators are lawyers, and the majority of them have a background in private, commercial practice. Many of the strongest criticisms of investment
treaty arbitration in its current form focus on arbitrators’ suitability to pass
150
judgment on complex questions of public policy. Our proposal does not
require arbitrators to answer such questions.
Second, there is the complexity of investment treaty arbitration, with
151
associated implications for the expense and duration of proceedings. Because balancing as a mode of reasoning invites argument about the policy
justifications for state conduct, it significantly increases the complexity of
proceedings. For example, in the course of its successful defense of its tobacco packaging law, Australia led evidence from twelve expert witnesses
on issues such as the strength of the public health evidence supporting the
152
law. It cost Australia at least 23 million Australian Dollars to defend the
claim (approximately $16 million USD), only half of which was ultimately
153
reimbursed by the claimant as a result of the tribunal’s costs order.
If a state is found to have breached an investment treaty, further complexity and associated cost arises in the determination of compensation. For
example, in Crystallex v. Venezuela led evidence in relation to four different
valuation methods which could be used to construct a future counter-factual
against which the claimant’s loss could be measured. Each of these valuation exercises was supported by underlying expert evidence and an associat-

149.
For a similar argument, see Frederico Ortino, Investment Treaties, Sustainable Development and Reasonableness Review: A Case Against Strict Proportionality Balancing, 30
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 71 (2017).
150.
GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007);
GUS VAN HARTEN, SOVEREIGN CHOICES AND SOVEREIGN CONSTRAINTS: JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION (2013); BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 1,
at 253–57.
151.
For data on costs and duration of existing proceedings, see BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 1, at 87–91; Gabriel Bottini, Julien Chaisse, Marko Jovanovic, Facundo Pérez Aznar
& Catherine Titi, Excessive Costs and Recoverability of Costs Awards in Investment Arbitration (Academic F. ISDS Concept Paper 2019/9, 2019); Anna De Luca, Crina Baltag, Daniel
Behn, Holger Hestermeyer, Gregory Shaffer, Jonathan Bonnitcha, José Manuel AlvarezZarate, Loukas Mistelis, Malcolm Langford, Clara López Rodríquez & Simon Weber, Duration of ISDS Proceedings (Academic F. ISDS Concept Paper 2020/1, 2020).
152.
Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Austl., PCA Case No. 201212, Final Award Regarding Costs, ¶ 86 (P.C.A. July 8, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/cases
/851.
153.
Jarrod Hepburn, Final Costs Details are Released in Philip Morris v. Australia Following Request by IAReporter, INT’L ARB. REP. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.iareporter.com
/articles/final-costs-details-are-released-in-philip-morris-v-australia-following-request-byiareporter/.
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ed financial model. It cost Crystallex $30 million USD to litigate the case.
In Tethyan Copper v. Pakistan the claimant spent $4.5 million USD on financial experts and $17.5 million USD on legal fees for the compensation
155
phase of proceedings alone. Pakistan spent almost $10 million USD defending the compensation phase, including both financial experts and legal
156
fees. Our proposal removes the complexity, expense and uncertainty associated with evaluation of the policy justifications for state conduct. It also
simplifies the quantification of compensation by making compensation referrable to a past counter-factual, rather than a future counter-factual.
Third, there is an issue that has received less attention. Because existing
jurisprudence on investment treaties maintains a sharp distinction between
the treaties’ substantive protections and the principles governing compensation, the application of existing treaties creates a “knife edge” of liability. A
state that only just fails to meet the threshold set by existing substantive protections must pay full compensation, whereas a state that just satisfies the
threshold pays nothing. This is a significant practical concern for states,
given that the determination of whether state conduct breaches treaty protections like FET turns on ex post judgments that are difficult to predict in ad157
vance. Other proposed modifications to the existing regime, such as the
inclusion of exception provisions to clarify that certain forms of regulatory
158
conduct are non-compensable, have the same “knife-edge” quality. In
contrast, compensation under our proposal varies according to the extent
that the underlying structure of state conduct reflects the problem of time
inconsistency.

154.
An unknown portion of this figure related to the quantification of compensation.
Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2,
Award, ¶ 949 (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw7194.pdf.
155.
Tethyan Copper Co. Pty Ltd. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/12
/1, Award, ¶ 1824 (July 12, 2019), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw10737.pdf.
156.
Id. ¶ 1831.
157.
For example, in the course of finding that Spain’s alteration of the regulatory regime governing investment in solar energy breached the Energy Charter Treaty, that tribunal
in 9REN specifically acknowledged that this outcome would have been uncertain for investors
considering the issue prospectively. 9REN Holding S.à.r.l. v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15
/15, Award, ¶ 412 (May 31, 2019), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw10565.pdf. For a similar argument in a different context, see Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1702–07 (1988).
158.
For example, treaty annexes clarifying the concept of indirect expropriation, still
require an ultimate judgement about whether there a measure amounts to indirect expropriation, in which case full compensation is required, or whether the measure does not amount to
indirect expropriation, in which case no compensation is required. The same is also true of
proposals for treaties to include clearly drafted exceptions provisions, such as van Aaken, supra note 21, at 526–27; Caroline Henckels, Should Investment Treaties Contain Public Policy
Exceptions?, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2825, 2843 (2018).
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For similar reasons, our proposal also addresses the three challenges
with previous attempts at operationalizing the use/regulation distinction
identified in Part III. Recall that Rubenfeld’s and van Aaken’s proposal are
based on either/or characterizations of state conduct. Although we agree that
there is a crucial conceptual distinction between time inconsistency (opportunism or use of property) and new information (regulation of property), we
recognize that the two problems are often intertwined in complex factual
scenarios. Our proposal is designed to avoid the challenges that come from
having to characterize a particular instance of state conduct in an either/or
way. This avoids related difficult evidentiary issues common both to existing jurisprudence and to other attempts to operationalize the use/regulation
159
distinction. For example, in a series of notorious disputes arising from
changes made to the legal regime governing investment in the Argentinian
gas industry following the Argentine financial crises in 2001, tribunals took
different views on the extent to which such financial crises were foreseeable
160
at the time that the investments were made. Our proposal does not require
a tribunal to determine the extent to which such crises were foreseeable. Rather, our rule is designed in such way that compensation is calibrated to
provide redress only to the extent that a state’s action is opportunistic, in an
objective sense.

V. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND DEMOCRATIC ARGUMENTS FOR OUR
PROPOSAL
Up to this point, we have taken the analysis of our companion paper as
providing the foundational economic rationale for our proposal. The companion paper shows that, unlike well-known alternatives considered in the
law and economics literature, our proposal guarantees improvements in both
host and home state welfare compared to a situation in which there is no investment treaty. In order to keep concepts clear, the analysis of our companion paper is deliberately parsimonious. Alternative legal arrangements are
evaluated solely according to their welfare effects, and the analysis of their

159.
Van Aaken proposes a different solution, whereby the challenges of verifying
whether new information is genuinely “new” mean that the issue should be left to the state in
question through the use of self-judging exceptions. van Aaken, supra note 21, at 526. The
challenge with this solution is that a state that is acting opportunistically can also be expected
to assert the applicability of available exceptions. Such a solution fails to provide protection to
investment in those circumstances when it is needed most.
160.
In CMS Gas v Argentina, Award, the tribunal held that the risk of financial crises
leading to currency valuation were foreseeable and actually foreseen by the parties. CMS Gas
Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Final
Award, ¶ 225 (May 12, 2005) 44 I.L.M. 1205 (2005). In LG&E v Argentina, the tribunal took
the view that the profound economic crisis in Argentina 2001-2002 went far beyond normal
‘economic problems’ or ‘business cycle fluctuations’ and threatened the total collapse of the
Argentinian state. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1,
Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 231–257 (Oct. 3, 2007) 46 I.L.M. 36 (2006).
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welfare effects is based on an economic model that incorporates standard
simplifying assumptions from the law and economics literature about the
host state’s decision-making. Specifically, the model in our companion paper is based on the assumptions that:
1. that the host state maximizes national welfare by weighing
the impact of measures under consideration on various national constituencies accurately and equally; and
2. the host state is totally indifferent to the impact of its decisions on foreign investors.
These simplifying assumptions are not necessarily realistic and tend to overstate the need for the protection that investment treaties provide. In Part V.A
below, we focus on problems with the first assumption, and their implications for our proposal. In Part V.B we examine problems with the second
assumption, and their implications. Taken together, these sections show that
integrating a more realistic account of government decision-making into our
model further strengthens the case for our proposal over the status quo under investment treaties. In Part V.C, we suggest that investment treaties’
implications for democratic decision-making should be considered. We argue there are strong democratic arguments for preferring our proposal to the
status quo.

A. Our Proposal’s Ability to Generate Global Welfare Improvement is
Robust to Variation in Assumptions about the Host State’s DecisionMaking Function
There is a large body of scholarship, spanning several disciplines, that
suggests that government decision-making does not necessarily maximize
national welfare. This body of scholarship includes work by political economists arguing that concentrated domestic interests tend to have greater in161
fluence on policy-making than diffuse interests; work by political scientists on the extent to which politicians use control of the state apparatus to
162
favor their own supporters; work by sociologists on the role of policy
163
elites in shaping state conduct; and work by socio-legal scholars on how
164
front-line bureaucrats make decisions within legal constraints. As well as

161.
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (Mancur Olson ed., 1965); George Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protection for Sale, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 833 (1994).
162.
See Andrew Harris & Daniel Posner, (Under What Conditions) Do Politicians Reward Their Supporters? Evidence from Kenya’s Constituencies Development Fund, 113 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 123 (2019).
163.
Janine Wedel, From Power Elites to Influence Elites: Resetting Elite Studies for the
21st Century, 34 THEORY CULTURE & SOC. 153 (2017).
164.
Simon Halliday, Jonathan Ilan & Colin Scott, The Public Management of Liability
Risks, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 527 (2011); Lael R. Keiser, Understanding Street-Level
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raising doubts about whether government decision-making necessarily maximizes national welfare, this body of scholarship suggests that any single
theory will struggle to account for the diversity in decision-making between
various organs government across states that vary in their history, size, in165
come and institutional arrangements.
These concerns are particularly acute in the context of investment treaties for two reasons. First, investment treaties apply to a variety of states,
both developed and developing; they apply to states with democratic forms
166
of government, autocracies, and every other possible form of in between.
Second, investment treaties apply to the conduct of all state organs: national
and sub-national levels of government, parliaments, presidents, ministers,
and specialized regulatory agencies. Because the decision-making of different organs of government in different states can be expected to vary, it is
important to consider how our proposal performs under diverse assumptions
about government decision-making.

1. Investment Treaties as Applied to Government Actors that Ignore
Them
We first consider a variation to our initial assumptions in which decision-makers within the state apparatus ignore the risk of liability under an
investment treaty. This is a realistic model of government decision-making
in at least in some circumstances. Empirical scholarship on the impact of
investment treaties on government decision-making suggests a very low
level of awareness of the constraints imposed by the treaties across govern167
ments in some developing countries. In other cases, government decisionmakers have been aware but apparently indifferent to the risk of liability
under investment treaties, because the decision-maker adopting the measure

Bureaucrats’ Decision Making: Determining Eligibility in the Social Security Disability Program 70 PUB. ADM. REV. 247 (2010).
165.
See David Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000).
166.
Aside from a handful of micro-states, Brazil is the only state that is not bound by
any investment treaties containing ISDS provisions. Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator,
U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investmentdispute-settlement (last visited May 27, 2020).
167.
MAVLUDA SATTOROVA, THE IMPACT OF INVESTMENT TREATY LAW ON HOST
STATES (Hart Publishing, 1st ed. 2018); Emma Aisbett, Matthias Busse & Peter Nunnenkamp,
Bilateral Investment Treaties as Deterrents of Host-Country Discretion: The Impact of Investor-State Disputes on Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries 154 REV. WORLD
ECON. 119, 121–22 (2018); Jonathan Bonnitcha, The Impact of Investment Treaties on Domestic Governance in Myanmar, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND
ARBITRATION ACROSS ASIA 335, 336–37 (Julien Chaisse & Luke Nottage eds., 2018) (on file
with author).
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did not bear the cost of paying compensation for breach of the investment
168
treaty.
When the host state ignores the risk of liability under an investment
treaty, the treaties’ global welfare impacts depend solely on their effect on
169
foreign investors’ decision-making. An investor considering making an
investment will consider the probability of adverse state conduct along with
the amount of compensation it will receive in the event of such conduct and
invest only if the project is expected to be profitable having taken into account these risks. Although our proposal does not reduce the likelihood of
adverse state conduct, it does reduce the financial risk that opportunistic
government conduct poses to the investor compared to a situation in which
there is no investment treaty. This makes more projects under consideration
profitable for the investor, and more investment occurs. As such, our rule
creates benefits for investors. The increase in investment induced by our
proposal also benefits the host state, regardless of whether the state ends up
interfering with particular investments. This is because the principles governing compensation under our proposal ensure that, in the case of each and
every investment, the host state can never be left worse off than if the investment were not made. As such, the Pareto improving, and hence global
welfare improving, property of our rule is robust to the situation in which
actual decision-makers within the government apparatus of the host state
ignore the risk of having to pay compensation under investment treaties.

2. Investment Treaties and States That are Not Benevolent
As a second variation, we consider a situation in which the host state’s
decision-making function fully internalizes the costs and benefits of conduct
under consideration to the state itself, but undervalues the effects of its conduct on other domestic constituencies. This variation inverts some of the assumptions of our first variation, yet is also is a realistic model of government decision-making in at least in some circumstances. It is consistent with
scholarship that posits the existence of “fiscal illusion” in the state appa-

168.
In the case of Metalclad v. Mexico, the Governor of San Luis Potosi issued a decree
preventing the investment from operating three days before the end of his term in office. In
the case of Abitibi Bowater v. Canada, the province of Newfoundland and Labrador expropriated and refused to compensate the investor. The dispute was ultimately settled when the Canadian federal government stepped in to compensate the investor. Bertrand Marotte & John
Ibbitson, Provinces on Hook in Future Trade Disputes: Harper, GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 26,
2010),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/provinces-on-hook-in-futuretrade-disputes-harper/article1378647/.
169.
The payment of compensation (states will still have to pay compensation for
breaching investment treaties, even if they ignore this risk in their decision-making) would
also need to be taken into account in determining the impact on host state and investor welfare. The payment of compensation, however, has no net impact on global welfare expect
through its ex ante effects on the behavior of various actors.
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170

ratus, and with theories of government decision-making in personalist dictatorships, in which the interests of the state are thought to be indistinguish171
able from those of the self-interested ruler.
Relaxing the assumption that the host state fully values domestic constituencies’ welfare does not affect the likelihood of opportunistic conduct
in relation to foreign investments, as the risk of opportunism is driven by the
host state’s desire to capture benefits for itself. In contrast, the host state’s
predicted response to new information about the investment’s impact on
domestic constituencies—for example, social and environmental impacts—
changes markedly. A host state which undervalues its own constituencies’
welfare is substantially less likely to make inefficient changes to the domestic legal regime which seek to protect these constituents at the cost of the
172
foreign investor. In other words, under this variation to the assumptions
there is more likely to be under-regulation than over-regulation of investment compared to the globally efficient level. This strengthens the justification for our proposal, which is designed to solve time inconsistency problems for the host state, not to change the way that the host state mediates
between competing interests when responding to new information.
Let us now add an extra degree of realism and assume that the host state
is also uncertain about the exact value of the welfare impact of the conduct
under consideration for those constituencies—for example, because of the
challenges in ascribing a dollar value to environmental harm to local com173
munities. (The same issue arises if the host state is certain about the value
of these impacts, but uncertain about how the tribunal will value those im174
pacts.) This combination of fiscal illusion and uncertainty has serious im-

170.
Blume and Rubinfeld define fiscal illusion as the assumption that the consequences
of government decision-making “are generally discounted by the decision-making body unless
they explicitly appear as a budgetary expense.” Lawrence Blume & Daniel Rubinfeld, Compensation for Taking: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 621 (1984).
171.
See, e.g., Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 567 (1993).
172.
To illustrate, consider a state that is considering shutting down an investment in
response to new information about environmental harm it causes to the local community. A
state that fully internalizes the community’s welfare will shut the investment down once the
value of the environmental harm exceeds the fiscal benefit to the state of allowing the investment to continue to operate. A state that is indifferent to the interests of the local community
will never shut a revenue-generating investment down, even if the state is also indifferent to
investor’s welfare.
173.
Here, we are considering uncertainty on the part of the host government decisionmaker at the time when it decides whether to change the domestic legal regime governing the
investment. This goes beyond the assumptions about uncertainty made in our companion paper, which assumed that all parties are uncertain about the value of the external impacts of an
investment at the time when that investment is made, but certain about the value of those impacts at the time at which the host state decides whether to respond by changing the domestic
legal regime.
174.
For consideration of more complex issues arising from asymmetric information and
uncertainty on the part of arbitral tribunals, see, e.g., Emma Aisbett, Larry S. Karp & Carol
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plications for existing jurisprudence, insofar as liability turns on a tribunal’s
judgment about the balance the state has struck between the foreign investor’s interests and wider public interests. Given uncertainty about the value
of costs and benefits associated with an investment to domestic constituencies, a government decision-maker considering how to respond to new information will be unsure whether altering the domestic legal regime will
trigger liability under an investment treaty. Faced with this uncertainty, a
government decision-maker who suffers from fiscal illusion will give greater weight to the risk of being required to compensate the investor than to the
expected harm to domestic constituencies. This leads the decision-maker to
be less willing to alter the domestic legal regime than is justified from a
175
global efficiency perspective creating a sort of “regulatory chill.” This
strengthens the argument for preferring our proposal to the status quo.

B. Our Proposal is Preferable from a Political Economy Perspective
that Recognises the Possibility of Investor Lobbying and State Capture
A related concern is the interaction between investment treaties’ design
and the political economy of investors’ influence over the host state. These
concerns arise from an agency problem. A state is an abstract legal entity,
whereas the government officials who enter into legal arrangements on behalf of the state are individuals who may have private interests of their own.
Corruption is the most extreme manifestation of this tension. For example,
state officials may have private incentives to accept bribes in return for
granting an investor a valuable concession contract. Other manifestations
include the susceptibility of government officials to lobbying, political donations and other legal forms of influence, and the related tendency of investors to use these forms of influence to engage in rent-seeking. For example, an investor may lobby government officials to award it a long-term
concession contract without a competitive tender, or cultivate personal relationships with government officials to obtain confidential information about
176
plans for the privatization of state assets. To be sure, these concerns are
not specific to the relationship between foreign investors and host states.

McAusland, Police Powers, Regulatory Taking And The Efficient Compensation Of Domestic
And Foreign Investors, 86 ECON. RECORD 367 (2010); JAN PETER SASSE, AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (U. Hamburg ed., 2011).
175.
Emma Aisbett, A Welfare Economic View of International Investment Agreements,
Address at OECD Freedom of Investment Roundtable (Oct. 17, 2015). Aisbett also makes the
more general point that investment treaties as they are currently drafted and interpreted are
likely to exacerbate inefficiency that results from states undervaluing the welfare of their own
constituencies. See also Been & Beauvais, supra note 29, at 99.
176.
Daniel R. Fischel & Alan Sykes, Government Liability for Breach of Contract, 1
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 313, 347 (1999).

278

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 42:231

But such allegations of impropriety are common in investment treaty arbi177
tration.
Before turning to the analysis of our proposal, there is an important
threshold question: Whether foreign investments acquired through transactions that are not at arm’s length are excluded from the coverage of investment treaties from the outset. Arbitral tribunals have consistently precluded
foreign investors from invoking the protection of investment treaties if an
178
investment was acquired corruptly. Many tribunals have also held investment treaties do not protect investments made in clear contravention of the
179
law of the host state as it stood at the time the investment was made, although jurisprudence on this point is more equivocal.
What is clear is that investments that are acquired through forms of influence that are legal or arguably legal under the law of the host state are
180
entitled to the protection of investment treaties. For example, in Sanum v.
Laos the investor acquired a majority stake in valuable monopoly concessions to operate casinos in Laos near the border with China. The concessions were acquired through a series of related agreements with the Lao
181
state and a private Lao entity. Information contained in the award suggests
182
that the investor paid as little as $3.5 million USD for the concessions,

177.
An example of case in which these allegations were made is Hussain Sajwani,
Damac Park Ave. for Real Est. Dev. S.A.E. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB
/11/16, Procedural Order (Sept. 10, 2014), discussed in Jonathan Bonnitcha, Investment Treaties and Transition from Authoritarian Rule 15 J. WORLD INV. TRADE 965, 982 (2014); Chris
Hamby, Inside the Global “Club” That Helps Executives Escape their Crime, BUZZFEED
NEWS (Aug. 28, 2016). The case ultimately settled.
178.
Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶
110 (Oct. 4, 2013), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3012.pdf;
Andrea Menaker, The Determinative Impact of Fraud and Corruption on Investment Arbitrations, 25 ICSID REV. 67, 69 (2010).
179.
See, e.g., Vladislav Kim v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 394–404 (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/italaw8549.pdf; Plama Consortium Ltd v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 135 (Aug. 27, 2008), 17 ICSID Rep. 659 (2016); Phoenix
Action, Ltd v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 101 (Apr. 15, 2009),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0668.pdf; Stephan Schill, Illegal
Investments in Investment Treaty Arbitration 11 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS & TRIBUNALS 281,
322–23 (2012); Bonnitcha, supra note 177.
180.
Another example is the case of Unión Fenosa Gas, S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt.
Here, the tribunal held that the investor was entitled to the protection of the investment treaty,
notwithstanding the fact that it had exercised “influence. . . over senior decision-makers at the
Ministry of Petroleum and EGPC [the Egyptian General Petroleum Company]” in procuring
the investment contract. Unión Fenosa Gas, S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/14/4, Award of the Tribunal, ¶ 7.109 (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/case-documents/italaw10061.pdf.
181.
Sanum Investments Ltd. v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PCA Case No.
2013-13, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 33 (Dec. 13, 2013), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/italaw3322.pdf.
182.
Id. ¶ 24
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plus an additional contribution to financing the development of the casi183
nos. These amounts are surprisingly low, given that the casinos proved
184
lucrative. Laos did not allege corruption or illegality in the acquisition of
185
the investment in these proceedings. It did, however, draw attention to the
apparent discrepancy between the amount invested by the claimant and the
value of rights thereby acquired, and argued that the investment should not
186
be eligible for the protection of the treaty. The tribunal rejected these arguments on the basis that the protection of the treaty depended on the validi187
ty of the rights acquired, not the amounts involved in the transactions. In
the analysis that follows we take this position—that foreign investment is
not automatically excluded from the protection of an investment treaty because it was acquired below market value, or through a non-arm’s length
transaction—as given.
In this context, there are two ways in which investment treaties interact
with the political economy of corporate influence over government deci188
sion-making. First, investment treaties increase the return to rent-seeking
behavior in the making of new investments. In the absence of an investment
treaty, a foreign investor who obtains privatized state assets or concession
rights through non-arm’s length transactions is vulnerable to revocation or
renationalization. Investment treaties make rent-seeking a more attractive
strategy by conferring legal protection on these ill-gotten gains. The second
dynamic runs counter to the first. In the absence of an investment treaty, investors are more vulnerable to adverse conduct of the state over the lifespan
of the investment. As such, investors have a financial incentive to cultivate
and exercise influence over the host state to maintain the value of their investment. By conferring legal protection on foreign investment, investment
treaties reduce the need for this ongoing rent-seeking behavior after the investment is made.
So far as we are aware, investment treaties’ impact on the prevalence of
both forms of rent-seeking has not been investigated empirically to date. Instead, we consider the implications of the design of investment treaties for

183.
The latter figure was estimated at around $65 million USD by the respondent and
as at least $85 million USD by the claimant. Id. ¶¶ 40, 140.
184.
Id. ¶ 40.
185.
In parallel proceedings brought by the investor’s parent company under a different
investment treaty, Laos has subsequently alleged corruption on the part of the investor. These
allegations have not been proven and it is unclear whether they relate to the acquisition of the
investment. Lao Holdings N.V. v. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/12/6, Procedural Order No. 11 (Jun. 25, 2018), https://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/case-documents/italaw9767_0.pdf.
186.
Sanum Investments Limited v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PCA Case No.
2013-13, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 40, 131–136 (Dec. 13, 2013), https://www.italaw.com
/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3322.pdf.
187.
Id. ¶¶ 316–321
188.
Fischel & Sykes, supra note 176, at 342.
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both dynamics, focusing on a comparison between our proposal and the status quo. We use the simple example of outright expropriation as an illustration. The same tension plays out in a similar way across more complex fact
scenarios.
Under the status quo, a foreign investor is entitled to full market value
compensation for expropriation, even if the investment was originally acquired from the state for much less than its market value. In this way existing investment treaties increase investors’ incentive to engage in rentseeking in the acquisition of investments, compared to the situation in which
there is no investment treaty. In contrast, under our proposal a foreign investor’s entitlement to compensation for expropriation is, at most, the price
originally paid for the investment. An investor that uses influence over government officials to obtain a state’s assets below their market value will find
that its entitlement to compensation in the event of subsequent renationalization of those assets is also reduced. (One situation in which this fact pattern arises is when there is a transition from an authoritarian to a more democratic regime in a state, and the incoming regime seeks to recover assets
189
transferred to cronies of the former regime.) As such, our proposal does
not substantially increase investors’ incentive to engage in rent-seeking behavior in the acquisition of investments, compared to the situation in which
there is no investment treaty.
By guaranteeing some compensation for expropriation, our proposal also reduces investors’ incentive to engage in rent-seeking throughout the
lifespan of the investment, compared to the situation in which there is no
investment treaty. However, because compensation under our proposal is
inevitably less than the expected value of the unexpropriated investment to
the investor, there remains some incentive to engage in ongoing rentseeking. In contrast, the status quo eliminates investors’ incentive to engage
in rent-seeking throughout the lifespan of the investment, because any expropriation must be accompanied by compensation equivalent to the expected value of the investment.
Although both forms of rent-seeking behavior are socially wasteful and
undermine domestic investment governance, there are good reasons to design legal rules to minimize investors’ incentive to engage in the former, rather than the latter. Following Fischel and Sykes, our argument is based on
190
the uncertainties of government decision-making within host states.
Where the benefits of rent-seeking behavior are more certain, we should expect rational investors to engage in such behavior. Rent-seeking relating to
the acquisition of investment involves a single time-period. Under investment treaties as they are currently drafted, once an investment is acquired
through a non-arm’s length transaction the benefits of such behavior are secured for the duration of the investment. This creates an incentive for large

189.
190.

Bonnitcha, supra note 177, at 985.
Fischel & Sykes, supra note 176, at 343.
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expenditures on rent-seeking. In contrast, an investor considering engaging
in rent-seeking throughout the lifespan of an investment is always vulnerable to a change of government or public sentiment at a subsequent date. (Indeed, it may be that investors who are perceived to have benefited from cozy relationships with government officials are more vulnerable to backlash
in the medium term.) The inherent uncertainty about the effectiveness of
ongoing rent-seeking as a strategy reduces the benefit to investors of engaging in it, even in the absence of an investment treaty. For this reason, further reducing the incentive for investors to engage in such behavior should
not be a primary consideration in the design of investment treaties’ substantive protections. Instead, our proposal should be preferred to the status quo
because it does not create incentives for investors to engage in rent-seeking
in the acquisition of investments.

C. Our Proposal is Preferable from a Democratic Perspective
Investment treaties constrain the conduct of the state. This inevitably
191
raises questions about their interaction with democratic decision-making.
To be sure, not every state that is bound by an investment treaty is a democ192
racy. But investment treaty claims against democracies are far more
193
common than the investment treaties’ proponents seem to assume. Understanding investment treaties’ interaction with democratic decision-making
also has at least some relevance to wider questions about their relationship
with responsive governance in non-democratic states or state that are only
194
partially democratic.
Concerns about investment treaties’ intersection with democracy have
two dimensions. The first concerns the process by which the treaties were
adopted, including whether the content of the treaties was understood by the

191.
Martti Koskenniemi, It’s Not the Cases. It’s the System.: M. Sornarajah, Resistance
and Change in the International Law on Foreign Investment, 18 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE
343, 347 (2017) (characterizing investment treaties as embodying a particular set of beliefs
about the relationship between democracy and economic governance); see also RoseAckerman, supra note 157, at 1702 (suggesting that the central challenge in designing constitutional principles that protect private property from adverse government action is “to reconcile an unpredictable, democratically responsible polity with the existence of a capitalist
economy based on private property and individual initiative.”).
192.
See José E. Alvarez, Review: Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law by Gus
van Harten, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 909 (2008).
193.
For example, Jan Paulsson has written that “a country governed in accordance with
the rule of law has little to fear from BITs.” Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25 ICSID REV. 339, 347 (2010). But, in important empirical work, Williams
shows that democracies are more likely to be subject to claims under investment treaties than
non-democratic states even after controlling for other variables, such as inbound FDI stock.
See Zoe Philipps Williams, Risky Business or Risky Politics: What Explains Investor–State
Disputes? (2016) (Ph.D. dissertation, Hertie School of Governance) (on file with author).
194.
For example, in non-democratic states some agencies of government may nevertheless be sensitive to public opinion.
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public and whether the treaties were subject to appropriate parliamentary
scrutiny. Up until at least the end of the 1990s, most investment treaties
195
were adopted with minimal parliamentary scrutiny or public debate. Indeed, in many developing countries even those who negotiated investment
196
treaties did not fully appreciate their legal implications. The majority of
investment treaties in existence today date from this period. The lack of
democratic deliberation in their negotiation is not an argument in favor of
our proposal specifically, but it does raise questions about the democratic
197
legitimacy of the status quo.
Since the explosion of arbitrations in the mid-2000s, investment treatymaking has been subject to greater public scrutiny. For example, the U.S.
held public consultations prior to the revision of its model BIT in 2004.
Likewise, in 2014 the European Commission conducted public consultations on the inclusion of investment provisions in the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership. Investment treaties have also been discussed
198
extensively in the European Parliament.
Following a controversial challenge to its black economic empowerment policies, South Africa launched a three year review of its investment
policy regime, leading to a cabinet decision to terminate its entire stock of
199
investment treaties. Many other states have been reconsidering their approach to investment treaties, including Australia, Colombia, India, Indone200
sia, Morocco and Nigeria. Two observations can be made about this trend
to wider public deliberation and debate about investment treaties in recent
years: first, almost all such processes of deliberation have resulted in recommendations for change of the status quo and, second, that such changes
range from minor reform (in the case of the 2004 U.S. model BIT) to total
exit from the existing regime (in the case of South Africa). The picture that
emerges is not one of consensus between states on the desirability of the status quo, rather it is one of uncertainty and disagreement about the distribution of costs and benefits of existing investment treaties.
In this context, there is a strong democratic justification for our choice
of the Pareto criterion as the primary basis for evaluation of investment trea-

195.
LAUGE POULSEN, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: THE
POLITICS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 14–15 (Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2015).
196.
See id.
197.
MONTT, supra note 36, at 141–44. See also Been & Beauvais, supra note 29, at
137–38.
198.
E.g., European Union, Council Regulation No. 912/204, Recital 4., 2014 O.J.
(L257) 21. The EU is now proposing a new Multilateral Investment Court to replace ad hoc
arbitration of investment treaty disputes. We discuss the relationship between our proposal
and these developments infra Part VI.
199.
Mohammed Mossallam, Process Matters: South Africa’s Experience Exiting its
BITs 3 (GEG, Working Paper No. 2015/97, 2015).
200.
Morosini & Sanchez Badin, supra note 22.

Winter 2021]

Against Balancing

283

ties’ provision. A minimum requirement for a democratic state to enter into
201
treaties should be that the treaty increases national welfare. This limits the
range of possible treaties between democracies to those that improve the
welfare of all state parties—i.e. the Pareto criterion. Our companion paper
shows that, unlike alternatives that approximate the level of protection currently provided by investment treaties, our proposal meets this criterion.
The second dimension of investment treaties’ intersection with democracy relates to the constraints the treaties place on host states once in
202
force. Investment treaties allow foreign investors to demand compensation for new legislation passed by democratically elected parliaments and
for exercise of administrative power that elected officials validly delegate to
203
agencies. It is no defense for a host to argue that it enacted the measure in
question according to a democratic process.
In this simple sense, investment treaties clearly constrain democratic
decision-making in the states that are bound by them. (The same could be
said of any international treaty backed by a binding dispute settlement system.) The extent of this constraint depends on the extent of protection from
legal and policy change that the treaties give to foreign investors. Our proposal places a lesser constraint on states than the status quo, both because
much government conduct for which compensation is currently required
would not be compensable under our proposal and because, insofar as compensation is required under our proposal, the amount would generally be
less than is the case under the status quo.
But there is another, more precise, sense in which investment treaties
constrain democratic decision-making. An essential characteristic of demo204
cratic governance is reversibility. A government may adopt particular
laws and policies. If members of the public oppose those laws and policies,
they are entitled to campaign against them. If enough members of the public
agree, a new government may be elected on a platform to alter what previously may have been regarded as settled. This basic process of contestation
and revision of the domestic legal regime is a normal and healthy part of the
democratic process. It is reflected in the foundational constitutional princi-

201.
Similarly, Kurtz, arguing that treaties are legitimate from a democratic perspective
if adopted through democratic processes and necessary to achieve instrumental benefits arising from international cooperation. Jürgen Kurtz, Building Legitimacy Through Interpretation
in Investor-State Arbitration: On Consistency, Coherence, and the Identification of Applicable
Law, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO
PRACTICE 257 (Zachery Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn, & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2014).
202.
DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION:
INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE (2008); MONTT, supra note 36, at 169–77.
203.
BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 1, at 235.
204.
David Schneiderman, Against Constitutional Excess: Tocquevillian Reflections on
International Investment Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 585 (2018).
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ple that “one legislature may not bind the legislative authority of its succes205
sors.”
Investment treaties, as they are currently drafted and interpreted, impose significant constraints on this process of democratic contestation.
These constraints are most obvious in the protection of foreign investors’
legitimate expectations—expectations that a state will continue to act consistently with assurances, policies, and laws in place when an investment
206
was made for the entire lifespan of the investment. In contrast, our proposal does not require compensation for a change in political priorities as
such, which fall within our conception of new information. A host state is
only liable if it has gained from not having had the new domestic legal regime in place from the outset, and the most it could be required to pay in
compensation is the value of the gain. In other words, under our proposal
the host state cannot end up worse off than if it had had the new legal regime in place from the outset. While there are still consequences for legal
and policy shifts under our proposal, it does not constrain democratic choice
in the sense that it doesn’t penalize a state for legal and policy reversals.
To illustrate, consider an example where a state approves an investor’s
mining project in a national park. The state is aware that the project will
have a negative environmental impact but decides that the economic development flowing from the proposal will outweigh this impact. An opposition
party opposes this decision on the grounds that the project’s environmental
impact outweighs its economic benefits. It campaigns on the platform of introducing a moratorium on mining in the national park, wins the election
and cancels the project. Under the status quo, this policy reversal triggers a
requirement to pay compensation equal to the expected value of the mine
had it been allowed to continue operation. Under our proposal, the state
cannot be left worse off than if it had had the moratorium in place from the
outset; at most, it will have to refund any gain it has made from allowing the
project, such as the price for which it sold the concession to the investor.

VI. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR PROPOSAL AND DISCUSSIONS IN
UNCITRAL WORKING GROUP III ON INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT REFORM
In the foregoing sections, we have made the case for a new approach to
liability and compensation under investment treaties. This leaves the question of how our proposal could be implemented as a practical matter. As we
207
have explained, existing principles governing liability and compensation

205.
United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996). This is sometimes called
the rule against entrenchment. For discussion, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665 (2002).
206.
For further discussion, see supra Section IV.a.1.
207.
See supra Section IV.a.
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under investment treaties emerge from the combination of the treaties’ express provisions and the accretion of arbitral jurisprudence relating to the
interpretation of those provisions. In theory, some aspects of our proposal
could be implemented in a decentralized way by arbitral tribunals themselves, through shifts in the interpretation of existing treaty provisions. For
example, tribunals might reconsider the justifications for protecting investors’ expectations under the FET standard, or for awarding investors compensation based on projections decades into the future of the income that an
investment project would have earned. However, arbitral tribunals’ practice
of relying on the decisions of past tribunals as authority mean that significant shifts in jurisprudence are unlikely in the absence of state interven208
tion. And other aspects of our proposal—notably, the integration of
gained-based considerations into the assessment of compensation—could
only be implemented through the amendment of existing investment trea209
ties. Many states are currently reconsidering their existing treaty practice.
In this context, our proposal provides a basis for the amendment of existing
treaties and for the negotiation and drafting of new investment treaties in the
future.
Our proposal also has implications for the multilateral discussions about
the reform of investment treaties’ investor-state dispute mechanism current210
ly underway in UNCITRAL Working Group III. The UNCITRAL Working Group’s mandate was originally defined narrowly, to prevent disagreements about the substantive content of investment treaties from derailing
211
attempts to find agreement on reform of the arbitration process. The EU’s

208.
Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The
Dual Role of States 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 190 (2010). For an empirical analysis, see Wolfgang Alschner, Ensuring Correctness or Promoting Consistency? Tracking Policy Priorities
in Investment Arbitration Through Large-Scale Citation Analysis, in EMPIRICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 1 (Daniel Behn, Ole Kristian Fauchald & Malcolm Langford eds., 2019).
209.
See Roberts, supra note 208 (arguing that states have the power to amend treaties,
including to the detriment of investors).
210.
For commentary on the process, see Anthea Roberts, Blog of the European Journal
of International Law, EJIL: TALK!, https://www.ejiltalk.org/author/aroberts/ (last visited Mar.
25, 2021).
211.
In 2017, the Working Group agreed to proceed with its work in three stages, “(i)
first, identify and consider concerns regarding ISDS; (ii) second, consider whether reform was
desirable in light of any identified concerns; and (iii) third, if the Working Group were to conclude that reform was desirable, develop any relevant solutions to be recommended to the
Commission.” U.N. Comm’n on Int’l L. & Trade, Rep. of Working Group III (Investor-State
Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of its Thirty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/930
/Rev.1 3 (Dec. 19, 2017).
In 2018, the Working Group stated the concerns which had identified, which were group
under three headings:
A.

Concerns pertaining to the lack of consistency, coherence, predictability and
correctness of arbitral decisions by ISDS tribunals
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proposal to establish a new multilateral investment court has been a focal
212
point for these debates about reform of the ISDS mechanism.
The original definition of the Working Group’s mandate overlooks the
many ways in which procedural concerns relating to ISDS as an adjudicative mechanism and substantive concerns relating to the liability and compensation under investment treaties are intertwined. Consider, for example,
the EU’s proposal for a multilateral investment court. The decisions of such
a court would have greater legitimacy than those rendered by arbitral tribunals; doctrinal principles established or endorsed by such a court would then
be difficult to revisit. The potential for a multilateral investment court to endorse and legitimize existing jurisprudence on compensation and damages is
particularly concerning. Existing principles governing damages under investment treaties are largely a creation of arbitral doctrine. If debate about
compensation and damages under investment treaties were deferred until
after the conclusion of the UNCITRAL process, there is a real risk that a
newly created multilateral investment court will already have “locked in”
the existing approach to damages.
In response to these concerns, several states have argued for a broaden213
ing of the Working Group’s mandate. In particular, in the October 2019
session, both Nigeria and Pakistan argued successfully for the addition of
compensation and damages under investment treaties to the Working
214
Group’s agenda as a “cross-cutting” issue. Our proposal speaks directly to

B.

Concerns pertaining to arbitrators and decision makers

C.

Concerns pertaining to cost and duration of ISDS cases

See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l L. & Trade, Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Reform) on the Work of its Thirty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/964 6, 11, 16
(Nov. 6, 2018).
This framing has then been reflected in the questions addressed by the academic working
group. For criticism, see Open Letter on the Asymmetry of ISDS, ERASMUS INST. PUB.
KNOWLEDGE, https://www.eur.nl/en/news/erasmus-institute-public-knowledge (last visited
Jun. 25, 2020).
212.
Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State
Arbitration 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 410 (2018). For the substance of the EU proposal, see generally U.N. Comm’n. on Int’l Trade L., Report of Working Group III on its Thirty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.159/Add.1 (Jan. 18, 2019), https://trade.ec.europa.eu
/doclib/docs/2019/january/tradoc_157631.pdf.
213.
Anthea Roberts & Taylor St. John, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reform: Visualising a
Flexible Framework, EJIL: TALK! (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isdsreform-visualising-a-flexible-framework/ (citing the submissions by Indonesia, Bahrain, Thailand, South Africa and various NGOs).
214.
On Pakistan and Nigeria’s intervention, see Anthea Roberts & Taylor St. John,
UNCITRAL and ISDS Reform: In Sickness and In Health, EJIL: TALK! (Oct. 23, 2019), https:
//www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reform-in-sickness-and-in-health/. On the revised agenda,
see U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Set-
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the issue, and provides a principled approach to addressing concerns about
out-size awards under existing jurisprudence. As of mid-2020, the Working
Group is considering modalities for reform, with attention being given to the
possibility of a multilateral instrument containing a menu of various reform
options. States that became party to such an instrument could then give their
215
consent to “opt in” to specific reforms. If two states “opt in” to the same
reforms, the effect would be to amend any bilateral investment treaty between those states to incorporate the reform in question. In this way, a multilateral instrument can avoid the practical problems that would arise from
states having to negotiate the amendment of thousands of investment treaties one-by-one, while accommodating the fact that different states may be
inclined to move at different speeds on different reform options. Such a
multilateral instrument could include substantive reforms to the content of
216
underlying investment treaties, as well as reforms to the ISDS process.
Our proposal is well-suited to inclusion in such an instrument, particularly
insofar as it addresses the principles governing compensation and damages
under investment treaties. The multilateral instrument that will likely
emerge from the UNCITRAL Working Group is the most promising means
by which our proposal could be implemented in practice.
To facilitate the inclusion of our proposal, insofar as it relates to the
principles governing compensation and damages, in such a multilateral instrument it is important to translate it into legal text that is as prescriptive as
possible, to reduce the risk of misunderstanding by tribunals that may not
appreciate the underlying economic and policy rationales for our approach.
With this in mind, we propose the following text:
(1) To determine the amount of compensation due for expropriation or for
any other measure(s) that breach(es) this treaty, the tribunal shall first
determine whether, if the measure(s) had been in place immediately
prior to the time at which the investor made its investment, the investor
would, nevertheless, have made the investment:
a. To determine whether the investor would have made the investment, the tribunal shall consider objective rather than subjective factors. In particular, the tribunal shall base its decision
on whether, if the measure(s) had been in place immediately

tlement Reform) on the Work of its Thirty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc A/CN.9/1004* (Oct. 23,
2019).
215.
See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Multilateral Instrument on ISDS Reform: Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc A
/CN.9/WG.III/WP.194, ¶¶ 8–9 (Jan. 16, 2020). For academic discussion, see Wolfgang
Alschner, The OECD Multilateral Tax Instrument: A Model for Reforming The International
Investment Regime?, 45 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1 (2019); Stephan W. Schill & Geraldo Vidigal,
Designing Investment Dispute Settlement à la Carte: Insights from Comparative Institutional
Design Analysis, 18 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBS. 314 (2019).
216.
Roberts & St. John, supra note 214.
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prior to the time at which the investor made its investment (but
if the situation in all other respects, including information
about the likelihood of future contingencies, was the same as
that facing the investor immediately prior to making its investment), the investment would, nevertheless, have been expected to generate a positive net return.
b. In the case of measure(s) amounting to expropriation of an investment, a tribunal shall conclude that the investor would not
have made the investment if the measure(s) had been in place
immediately prior to the time at which the investor made its investment, unless the host state proves otherwise.
(2) If the tribunal determines that the investor would have made the investment, then no compensation is due to the investor.
(3) If the tribunal determines that the investor would not have made the
investment, then the tribunal shall award the lesser of the following
amounts as compensation to the investor:

a. The value of the loss the investor has suffered, as compared to the situation the investor would have been in if it
had not made the investment; and
b. The value of the gain the host state has obtained, as compared to the situation the host state would have been in if
the investor had not made the investment.
i.

In assessing the value of 3(b) the tribunal shall take into account any payment the investor has made to the
host state to acquire the investment, any physical assets owned by the investor that have been transferred
into state ownership and any genuinely additive economic contribution of the investment to the host state’s
economy—for example, through the payment of wages
to employees in the host state at a higher rate than the
wages those employees would have earned if the investment had not been made. In assessing the value of
3(b) the tribunal shall deduct the value of any damage
caused by the investment’s operation to the host state.

By implication of the above, when either amount 3(a) or 3(b) is
zero, compensation shall be zero.
This language could also be incorporated into new treaties and into existing
treaties by way of an agreement to amend the treaty among the parties to it.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Investment treaties are highly unusual instruments of international law.
They provide a particular class of private actors—foreign investors—with
internationalized legal protection from state conduct, as well as a procedural
mechanism to enforce these rights. No other regime of international law
217
provides analogous protection to private actors. The existence and design
of these special privileges for foreign investors must be carefully justified.
In a companion paper we argue that, while there is an underlying economic
rationale for investment treaties, that rationale is more limited than lawyers
seem to assume. Investment treaties should seek to solve problems of time
inconsistency for the host state but should not seek to constrain the way that
states respond to new information. In this article, we explored the implications of this insight for the extent of substantive protection and the principles governing compensation under investment treaties.
We proposed that investment treaties should be redrafted so that:
i.

A state should only face the possibility of having to compensate a foreign investor if the host state breaches or
modifies the domestic legal regime governing the investment, and

ii.

Compensation should be the lesser of the investor’s loss
and the host state’s gain from the host state not having had
the new domestic legal regime in place when the investment was made. (When one or other of these values is zero, no compensation is required.)

In Part VI, we propose more detailed draft treaty text that explains how
compensation under the second limb of this proposal should be determined
in a step-by-step manner.
Key practical implications of our proposal are that states should not be
required to compensate investors in many of the circumstances that are
compensable under existing investment treaty jurisprudence and that, insofar as compensation is required, the amount of compensation will ordinarily
be less than is currently the case. Another distinguishing feature of our proposal is that it does not require arbitral tribunals to weigh or balance com-

217.
Regional regimes for human rights protection—such as the European Convention
of Human Rights—are a partial exception. See BONNITCHA, ET AL., supra note 1, at 65. But
even such regimes do not go so far as the investment treaty regime. A claimant to the European Court of Human Rights must first exhaust domestic remedies before bringing an international claim against a state. Exhaustion of domestic remedies is not required under investment
treaties. See Douglas, supra note 93, at 179. Moreover, the European Court of Human Right’s
jurisprudence on compensation for victims requires only “just satisfaction,” a much less generous standard than the principle of “full reparation” applied in the investment treaty regime.
See Veronika Fikfak, Changing State Behaviour: Damages before the European Court of
Human Rights, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1091, 1107 (2019).

290

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 42:231

peting interests in order to determine whether compensation is required or,
insofar as compensation is required, to determine the amount that should be
paid.
In Part III, we showed that this proposal builds on a line of scholarship
that distinguishes government use (or acquisition, or appropriation) of property from government regulation of private property. In Part IV we explained how our proposal resolves previous attempts to develop jurisprudence based on the use/regulation distinction. Part IV also argued that, by
eschewing the use of balancing techniques to determine whether the host
state has breached an investment treaty, our proposal solves many of the
practical problems with existing jurisprudence relating to the interpretation
and application of investment treaties. Taken together, Parts III and IV illustrate that our proposal is feasible and that it relies on information and legal
techniques that are available and familiar to arbitral tribunals.
Part V explored some of the wider policy arguments in favor of our
proposal. We showed that the ability of our proposal to generate welfare
benefits for both host and home states is robust to realistic variations in assumptions about government decision-making. We also considered the risk
of more serious pathologies in government decision-making, such as susceptibility to lobbying and capture by foreign investors. Finally, we argued
that there are strong democratic arguments for preferring our proposal to the
status quo. Taken together, the arguments in Part V strengthen our central
claim that our proposal is superior to the status quo.
Part VI considered the implementation of our proposal as a practical
matter and, in particular, the relationship between our proposal and the multilateral discussion on reform of the investment treaty regime currently underway in UNCITRAL Working Group III. In 2019, concerns about compensation and damages under investment treaties were added to the
Working Group’s agenda, demonstrating that reform in this area is a high
priority for states. As to the modalities of reform, the Working Group is
considering a multilateral instrument that would include a menu of procedural and substantive reforms. States that become party to such an instrument could then give their consent to “opt in” to specific reforms. Our proposal is well-suited to inclusion in such an instrument.

